The Perfect Crime? FIFA and the Absence of Accountability in Switzerland by Bean, Bruce
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
2017
The Perfect Crime? FIFA and the Absence of
Accountability in Switzerland
Bruce Bean
Michigan State University College of Law, bwbean@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bruce W. Bean, The Perfect Crime? FIFA and the Absence of Accountability in Switzerland, 32 Md. J. Int'l L. 68 (2017).
The Perfect Crime? FIFA and the Absence of 
Accountability in Switzerland 
PROFESSOR BRUCE W. BEAW 
The true test of a man's character is what he will do when no one 
is watching. John Wooden 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1904 the Federation Internationale de Football 
Association, universally known as FIFA, was established to 
organize, govern and promote "football," the sport North 
Americans and Australians call "soccer." Football has hundreds of 
millions of participants everywhere on Earth. Four-year old girls and 
boys and multi-millionaire superstars play this game, unquestionably 
the world's most popular sport. 
In May and December 2015 the United States Department 
of Justice released two indictments charging more than forty 
FIFA-affiliated persons and entities with bribery and other 
corrupt transactions extending over twenty-four years. 
© 2017 Bruce W. Bean. 
t Professor Bruce W. Bean has been teaching at Michigan State University Colkge of Law 
for 12 years. Previously he had practiced corporate law for 30 years in New York, Los 
Angeles and Moscow. Thanks to the participants at the University of Maryland Francis King 
Carey School of Law Symposium Corruption in Sports and to the participants at the 
Controlling Corruption Conference held at the University of Miami and organized by the 
Anti-Corruption Law Interest group of the American Society of International Law. Special 
thanks to Professor Andy Spalding, Professor Matt Stephenson, Professor Lawrence 
Trautman and Jonathan Rusch 
1. John Wooden was the basketball coach at UCLA from 1948 to 1975. During this 
time he won ten NCAA championships, including seven in a row. See John Wooden, 
BIOGRAPHY.COM, https://www.biography.com/people/john-wooden-21369 l 83. 
68 
2017] THE PERFECT CRIME? 69 
What? There's corruption in sports you say? Yes, the 
many temptations which the billions of dollars football generate 
have not been neglected. FIFA has endured more than a century of 
scandals and yet remains all powerful and fundamentally corrupt. 
Why is this? Does anyone care? Should something be done? 
This article briefly reviews FIFA' s recent corruption scandals and 
details the steps FIFA has taken to create its Potemkin style, "good-
looking corporate governance." This article highlights that 
absent imposing accountability on FIFA, the deliberate abuse of 
FIFA' s obligations to players, teams, officials, fans and sponsors 
of the world's most popular sport will continue. The future for 
FIFA and football looks a great deal like its past century. The 
administration of global football is on track to continue its long 
history of corruption, of mendacity cloaked in opacity. 
Part I presents the background of FIFA as an institution, setting 
out football's global corruption landscape and then focuses on 
corruption within FIFA today. Part II describes the corporate 
governance mechanisms that have developed to deal with 
commercial corruption in the business community and notes the lack 
of success we have had in this realm. We then consider the most 
recent FIFA "reforms" triggered by recently revealed 
scandals, each such reform accompanied by positive-sounding 
press releases offered by FIFA' s spinmeisters and taken directly 
from FIFA's extensive "Corruption Crisis Playbook." The farcical 
nature of these reforms is explained. Part III considers the not-
very-promising prospects for reform under FIFA' s newly elected 
leadership, most of whose members have long enjoyed FIFA's 
lucrative opaque mendacity. Part IV surveys possible paths to 
accountability for FIFA, and Part V concludes by asking whether 
reform at FIFA is worth the struggle. 
FIFA's century-old motto is "For the Game. For the World." As 
this article demonstrates, however, the actual motto of those who 
control FIFA and football has been and remains - "Just for Us." 
I. FIF~hat is "football?" Football is played in every country, territory, 
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and remote island2 on the Earth, from North Korea and South Sudan to 
Antarctica.3 It is a game of skill requiring no elaborate infrastructure, 
no expensive equipment and no extraordinary physical characteristics 
for those who simply want to kick something like a ball toward a goal. 
At the height of professional football, of course, extraordinary skills are 
essential. In 1977 the Brazilian football legend, Pele, published "My 
Life and the Beautiful Game. "4 The "beautiful game" is a phrase that 
has long been associated with football.5 However, as more and more 
football scandals are revealed, that beautiful game looks very different. 
Early in 2014 a source leaked millions of documents to reporters at the 
London Sunday Times. A book based upon this trove of documents, 
"The Ugly Game: The Corruption of FIFA and the Qatari Plot to Buy 
the World Cup,"6 was published in 2015, describing an organization 
Pele would not want to recognize. 
A. What Is A FIFA? 
FIFA is a not-for-profit association organized under the Swiss 
Civil Code.7 Its mission is to "organize, govern and promote 
international football. "8 As the global authority for international 
football, FIFA has 211 members, one from each nation or territory with 
a football association. 9 FIFA members are national and other football 
associations which are also required to be members of one of FIFA's 
2. The Cook Islands, a group of islands spread over nearly 850,000 square miles of the 
South Pacific, approximately 2000 miles northeast of New Zealand, has a population 15,000. 
The Cook Islands is a full member of FIFA, as is Montserrat, a tiny Caribbean Island with a 
population of less than 5000. It is no accident that each of these islands has the same vote as 
every other FIFA Member, including China with 1.4 billion people and India with 1.3 billion. 
3. Nathan Bowen, Rothera Diary - January 2010, BRIT. ANTARCTIC SURV. (Jan. 30, 
2010), https://www.bas.ac. uk/blogpost/rothera-diary-january-2010/. 
4. In the original Portuguese the phrase is jogo bonito. See Barney Corkhill, logo 
Bonito: "The Beautiful Game", BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 16, 2008), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/69649-jogo-bonito-the-beautiful-game 
5. Id. 
6. HEIDI BLAKE & JONATHAN CALVERT, THE UGLY GAME: THE CORRUPTION OF FIFA 
ANDTHEQATARI PLOT TO BUY THE WORLD CUP (2015). 
7. CODE CIVIL [CC][Civ1LCODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 60 (Switz.). 
8. FIFA, FIFA STATUTES (Apr. ed. 2015), 
http://www. fi fa.com/mm/Document/ AFF ederation/Generic/02/5 8/14/48/20 l 5FIF AStatutesE 
N_Neutral.pdf. 
9. Associations, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/associations/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016). 
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six continental confederations, 10 CONCACAF, 11 CONMEBOL, 12 
UEFA, 13 CAF, 14 AFC, 15 and OFC. 16 
It has been recently estimated that global sports businesses 
generate at least $80 billion annually. 17 By one estimate football 
represents almost 40% of all sports revenue. 18 More than 70% of FIFA' s 
revenues arise from the sale of television and marketing rights to its 
World Cup and regional championship matches conducted every four 
years. 19 FIFA reported a $1.34 billion surplus at the end of 2015.20 
As a not-for-profit entity organized under Swiss Civil Law FIFA 
enjoys the unique privileges Switzerland provides to sports governing 
associations. For example, FIFA pays no income taxes to Switzerland.21 
Showing no interest in football's decades of match-fixing, money 
laundering, looting, self-dealing and bribery, Switzerland has become 
the Nirvana for Sports Criminals. Swiss hospitality to sports crime 
means that the Swiss are indeed "implicitly complicit" in FIFA's 
corruption. 
B. FIFA and Global Corruption 
1. The Department of Justice Indictments 
On May 27, 2015 the U.S. Department of Justice announced a 
10. FIFA, FIFA STATUTES art. 22 (Apr. ed. 2016), 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/Document/ AFF ederation/Generic/02/7 8/29/07 /FIF AStatutsweb 
EN_Neutral.pdf?t=1461659845938. 
11. CONCACAF - Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean 
Association Football. Id. art. 22(1). 
12. CONMEBOL - Confederacion Sudamerican de Futbol. Id. art. 22(l)(a). 
13. UEFA- Union des Associations Europeennes de Football. Id. art. 22(1)(c). 
14. CAF - Confederation Africaine de Football. Id. art. 22(1)(d). 
15. AFC -Asian Football Confederation. Id. art. 22(l)(a). 
16. OFC - Oceana Football Association. Id. art. 22(1)(f). 
17. Matt Andrews & Peter Harrington, Off Pitch: Footballs Financial Integrity 
Weaknesses and How to Strengthen Them 4, 24-56 (Ctr. Int'! Dev. Harv Univ., Working Paper 
No. 311 ), http://www.sports.growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/files/icss/files/cid_ wp_311.pdf. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers earlier published an estimate of $145 billion. 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, CHANGING THE GAME: OUTLOOK FOR THE GLOBAL SPORTS 
MARKET TO 2015 11 (Dec. 2011). 
18. Andrews & Harrington, supra note 17. 
19. Superseding Indictment at 7, United States v. Hawit, Cr. No. 15-252 (S-1) (E.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
20. 66TH FIFA CONGRESS, FINANCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REPORT 2015 15 (2016). 
21. Between 2007 and 2014 FIFA earned $969 million in profits on almost $10 billion in 
revenues. 66TH FIFA CONGRESS, FINANCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REPORT 2015, supra note 20. 
See also Andrews & Harrington, supra note 17. 
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lengthy indictment22 alleging twenty-four years of corrupt activities by 
FIFA-related persons and entities just in the Western Hemisphere. In 
December 2015, a ninety-two count superseding indictment (the 
"Indictment") was announced. 23 In all forty-one individuals and entities 
affiliated with FIFA have been indicted.24 Of these twenty had pled guilty 
by the end of2016.25 
Soccer in the United States is not as widely followed as American 
football, basketball or baseball. Thus, the egregious allegations of FIFA 
bribery and corruption in the Indictment did not surprise followers of 
international football in other nations, since for decades they have been 
learning of FIFA scandals of all kinds,26 including gambling,27 game-
fixing,28 money laundering, etc.29 As the Wall Street Journal noted: 
"When [the United States] finally started looking [at football], we were 
shocked at what we found. We were the only nation that would have 
been."30 
22. Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering 
Conspiracy and Corruption, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-
racketeering-conspiracy-and. The May 2015 indictment is available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/45021 l/download (last visited Aug. 4, 2017). 
23. Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and 
Corruption, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sixteen-
additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and-corruption. The superseding 
indictment occurred on Nov. 25. Superseding Indictment, supra note 19. 
24. Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and 
Corruption, supra note 23. 
25. See Appendix I for a list of defendants and their status as of January 14, 2017. 
26. A number of recent books and uncountable news articles document tales of corruption 
of all kinds at FIFA. E.g., ANDREW JENNINGS, FouL! THE SECRET WORLD OF FIFA: BRIBES, 
VOTE RIGGING AND TICKET SCANDALS (2006); ALAN TOMLINSON, FIFA (FEDERATION 
INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION): THE MEN, THE MYTHS AND THE MONEY (2014); 
ANDREW JENNINGS 0MERTA, SEPP BLATIER'S FIFA ORGANISED CRIME FAMILY (2014); HEIDI 
BLAKE & JONATHAN CALVERT, THE UGLY GAME: THE QATAR! PLOT TO BUY THE WORLD CUP 
(2015). 
27. DAVID GOLDBLATT, THE BALL IS ROUND: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF SOCCER 579 (2006). 
28. "Match-fixing and betting rackets have been a staple feature of European football for 
at least forty years." GOLDBLATT, supra note 27, at 766. More recently The Economist reported, 
"an alarming number of [Italian] matches are not contests at all, but choreographed 
performances, the results known before to some of the participants before any whistle is 
blown." Match-fixing in Italy You Betcha: Italians Are Not the Only Ones Throwing Matches, 
ECONOMIST (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21705256-italians-are-
not-only-ones-throwing-matches-you-betcha. 
29. See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH THE 
FOOTBALL SECTOR (2009), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20through%20the%20Football%20Sector.pdf. 
30. Will Leitch, The World Cup of Corruption, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2016, 3:56 PM) 
http://www. wsj .com/articles/the-world-cup-of-corruption-1464 3 79006. 
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But let's be fair. FIFA football is not the only corrupt entity out 
there. 
1. Is Football Corruption Unique? 
Each and every day of the year the media report new allegations 
of corruption, bribery, and other breaches of fiduciary duties. Such 
reports have besmirched college athletics in the United States,31 
international tennis,32 cycling,33 baseball,34 for-profit corporations, 35 the 
American Red Cross36 and the political process nearly everywhere. We 
are in fact overwhelmed with, and most likely inured to, daily 
allegations of corruption. For example, in just a few weeks surrounding 
the Rio Olympics in August 2016, corruption was alleged at the 
International Olympic Cornrnittee,37 the World Anti-Doping Authority 
("W ADA"),38 the drug testing laboratories at the Sochi Winter 
31. Jay M. Smith, Academic Fraud in Commercialized College Athletics, in GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION REPORT: SPORT 286-92 (Gareth Sweeney ed. 2016) (describing "academic 
comer-cutting and administrative chicanery" and concluding "American universities have 
been indelibly compromised by their willingness to subordinate academic integrity and 
educational outcomes to the eligibility imperatives of commercialised sport."). 
32. Ben Rothenberg, Italian Match Fixing Suspensions Imposed Amid Criticism of 
Tennis Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07 /25/sports/tennis/italy-tennis-match-fixing-
suspensions.htrnl. 
33. Rod Nordland, Afghan Women, Eager to Play, Are Relegated to the Sidelines, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27 /world/asia/afghanistan-women-
sports.htrnl. 
34. Mike Axisa, Banned Jenrry Mejia Plans to Sue MLB, Alleges Years of 'Corrupt Mob-
like Activity', CBSSPORTS.COM (July 11, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/banned-
jenrry-mejia-plans-to-sue-mlb-alleges-years-of-corrupt-mob-like-activity/. 
35. Robert Carmona-Borjas, The Corporate Climate of Corruption at Caterpillar 
Construction, INT'L PoL'Y DIG. (July, 13, 2016), 
https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/07I13/corporate-climate-corruption-caterpi liar-construction/. 
36. News Releases, CHUCK GRASSLEY I U.S. SENATOR FROM IA (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-releases-memo-red-
cross%E2%80%99-haiti-earthquake-relief-response-finds-red. The American Red Cross 
fought the Government Accountability Office's inquiry for nine months. The American Red 
Cross was Congressionally chartered in 1900. A June 17, 2016 New York Times editorial asked 
the American Red Cross to rebuild trust with the American public after it found 25% of Haitian 
aid funds contributed ($488 million) were dedicated to administration rather than direct aid. 
Trust Deficit at the Red Cross, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/20161061 I 7 /opinion/trust-defici t-at-the-red-cross.htrnl. 
37. Synopsis: The Lords of the Rings, Real Sports with Bryant Gumbel, HBO.COM (July 
26, 2016), http://www.hbo.com/real-sports-with-bryant-gumbel/episodes/0/232-
episode/synopsis/july-on-real-sports-with-bryant-gumbel.htrnl. 
38. Rebecca R. Ruiz et. al., Even With Confession of Cheating, World's Doping 
Watchdog Did Nothing, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2016), 
http ://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/ 16/sports/o lympics/world-anti-doping-agency-russia-
cheating. htrnl. The WADA scandal is tragic, if not surprising. In December 2012, WADA 
received an email from an Olympic athlete from Russia. She was asking for help. The athlete, 
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Olympics in 2014,39 the summer Olympics in 201640 and the entire 
Russian Olympic4 I and Paralympic programs.42 Beyond sports, we 
have had allegations of bribery, corruption and worse involving the 
Chief Executive Officer of Volkswagen AG,43 the bankers conducting 
the London gold-fixing scandal,44 the chief of the National Bank of 
Bangladesh,45 oligarchs in Moldova,46 the President of Iran,47 
international bankers involved with the LIBOR fixing scandal,48 a run-
of-the-mill Congressman from Philadelphia49 and a twelve-term 
a discus thrower named Darya Pishchalnikova, had won a silver medal four months earlier at 
the London Olympics. She said that she had taken banned drugs at the direction of Russian 
sports and antidoping authorities, and that she had information on systematic doping in her 
country. Please investigate, she implored the agency in the email, which was written in 
English."! want to cooperate with WADA," the email said. But WADA, the global regulator 
of doping in Olympic sports, did not begin an inquiry, even though a staff lawyer circulated 
the message to three top officials, calling the accusations "relatively precise," including names 
and facts. Instead, it did something that seemed antithetical to its mission to protect clean 
athletes. It sent Ms. Pishchalnikova's email to Russian sports officials - the very people that 
she said were running the doping program. Id. 
39. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Russia May Face Olympics Ban as Doping Scheme Is Con.firmed, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07 /19/sports/report-confirms-
state-sponsored-doping-by-russia-at-olympics.html. 
40. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Rio Drug-Testing Lab Is Suspended by Antidoping Regulator, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/sports/olympics/rio-drug-
testing-lab-is-suspended-by-wada.html. 
41. Ruiz et. al., supra note 38. 
42. Rio Paralympics 2016: Russian Athletes Banned After Doping Scandal, BBC (Aug. 
8, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/sport/disability-sport/37002582. 
43. Jack Ewing & Martin Winterkorn, Ex-C.E.O. a/Volkswagen, ls Under Investigation, 
N.Y. TIMES, (June 24, 2016), 
http ://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21 /business/international/volkswagen-winterkorn-
germany .html. 
44. Jonathan Stempel, Deutsche Bank Settles U.S. Gold, Silver Price-fixing Litigation, 
REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2016, 1: 17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/deutsche-bank-lawsuit-
metals-idUSL2Nl 7H 1 IA. 
45. Megha Bahree, Former Bangladesh Bank Chief Blames Global System for Theft, 
N. Y. TIMES (June 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/business/dealbook/former-
bangladesh-bank-chief-blames-others.html. 
46. Luke Coffey, IMF Caught in Moldova's Corruption Vortex, Time for the West to 
Wake up, WORLD POST (July 22, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/luke-coffey/imf-
caught-in-moldovas-co_b_l l 051150.html. 
47. Iran's President has been accused of awarding bonuses of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to his associates when the law sets the maximum salary at about $30,000 per year. 
Thomas Erdbrink, Iran's President ls Confronted by Scandal Over Inflated Government 
Wages, N.Y. TIMES, (July 17, 2016), 
http://www. nytimes .com/2016/0711 8/world/middleeast/irans-president-is-confronted-by-
scandal-over-inflated-government-wages.html. 
48. Jeff Desjardins, Chart: The Epic Collapse of Deutsche Bank, VISUAL CAPITALIST 
(July 8, 2016, 10:45 AM), http://www.visualcapitalist.com/chart-epic-collapse-deutsche-
bank/. 
49. Maryclaire Dale, Congressman Convicted in Case that Entangled Son, Wife, BIG 
STORY (June 21, 2016, 6:20 PM), 
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Congresswoman from Florida. 50 The list is unending. But for FIFA, 
while corruption scandals are constantly being reported, they go 
unremedied and unpunished. 
C. FIFA 's History of Corruption 
1. Early Corruption & Escalation Under Blatter51 
While the Department of Justice Indictment covers acts by many 
of the defendants dating back twenty-four years, football's intimate 
relations with bribery and corruption extend over many decades. David 
Goldblatt's definitive history of football includes anecdotes of football 
corruption that have occurred throughout FIF A's history. For example, 
the German Bundesliga of sixteen professional football teams was 
created in 1963; it enjoyed an early broadcast rights deal described as 
"one of the most generous of the early TV deals in Europe."52 
However, at the time "in the grey areas and loopholes created by the 
games complex system of regulation seethed an entire subculture of 
hidden payments, hot money, tax havens and corruption."53 In 1971 
information about bribes to win or lose football matches at the end of 
the season became public. Ultimately an "investigation into 
Bundesliga match-fixing and bribery ... generated so much irrefutable 
documentation that at least two-thirds of the entire league were 
implicated and over fifty players, coaches and [team] presidents" were 
banned from football for life.54 The list of early football scandals is 
close to endless. Goldblatt includes descriptions of corruption 
throughout football, including Yugoslavia,55 Brazil,56 China57 and 
http:/ /bigstory.ap.org/article/ffi b57 eab5884 7 l 9bad7409d41 fdb984/verdict-reached-
pennsylvania-congressmans-bribery-case. 
50. Scott Maxwell, Corrine Brown Delivered ... to Herself, Feds Say, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (July 13, 2016, 2:58 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-corrine-
brown-indicted-scott-maxwell-20160712-column.html. 
51. While FIFA has an incontrovertibly corrupt past, this section focuses principally upon 
FIFA during the seventeen-year reign of former FIFA President Joseph "Sepp" Blatter. 
52. GOLDBLATT. supra note 27, at 471. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 472. 
55. In 1966, more than half a century ago, Partizan Belgrade, a team :from Yugoslavia 
competed in the European Cup against Real Madrid. They were reportedly "offered the game" 
by the referee for $15,000 in hard currency. "However, [they] decided they could not afford 
it." GOLDBLATT. supra note 27, at 438. 
56. Id. at 819. 
57. Id. at 849-50. 
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France58 to Greece,59 Portugal,60 Romania,61 Italy,62 Poland,63 and South 
Africa. 64 
This history of corruption continued under FIFA president Joseph 
"Sepp" Blatter. The Department of Justice Indictment names 
individuals connected to the two Western Hemisphere football 
confederations, CONMEBOL and CONCACAF, as well as 
individuals and companies involved in marketing rights to various 
football events. 65 But, the most powerful personage in football during 
most of the period covered by the Department of Justice Indictment 
was Sepp Blatter. Blatter was elected to his first four-year term as 
FIFA President in 1998 after serving in various positions at FIFA 
under Brazilian Joao Havelange, FIFA's President from 1974 to 
1998.66 Blatter was hired by Havelange in 1975 and by 1981 had 
become second in command at FIFA. 67 It was under Havelange that 
FIFA and global football frrst saw great financial gains. 68 During his 
years as President, Havelange "almost single-handedly ... drove the 
expansion of the game and hugely increased its income from television 
rights and commercial activity."69 Havelange (and Blatter) oversaw 
FIF A's contracts with commercial sponsors such as Coca-Cola and 
Adidas, and, as reported: 
58. Id. at 572. 
59. Id. at 764. 
60. Id. at 763. 
61. Id. at 706-07. 
62. In Italy a gambling and game fixing scandal arose in early 1980 which resulted in 
police raids on March 2, 1980. At half-time during Sunday matches "the police swooped down 
on the nation's football grounds and dressing rooms and eleven players were arrested." 
GOLDBLATT. supra note 27, at 579. 
63. In Poland a team "bribed opponents and bugged dressing rooms." GOLDBLATT. supra 
note 27, at 704. 
64. Id. at 885-86. 
65. Indictment, supra note 19. 
66. Sepp Blatter profile: How a wedding singer became the most powerful player in 
football, ITV REPORT (May 29, 2015, 2:50 AM), http://www.itv.com/news/2015-05-29/sepp-
blatter-profile-how-a-wedding-singer-became-the-most-powerful-player-in-football/. 
67. Sepp Blatter calls predecessor Joao Havelange a 'teacher,' 'like a brother,' ESPN 
FC (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/post/2931329/sepp-blatter-calls-
predecesssor-joao-havelange-a-teacher,-like-a-brother. 
68. Martyn Ziegler, Havelange, Father of Fifa Corruption, Dies Aged 100, TIMES (Aug. 
17, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/havelange-father-of-fifa-corruption-
dies-aged-l OO-tljct58xq. 
69. Havelange is reported to have described his FIFA career as follows: "I found an old 
house and $20 in the kitty," he boasted. "On the day I departed 24 years later, I left property 
and contracts worth over $4 billion. Not too bad, I'd say." Ziegler, supra note 68.; Joiio 
Havelange, T1MES (Aug. 17, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/joao-
havelange-khdnxfOpc. 
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Under Havelange, Fifa became deeply corrupt. By most 
accounts, he was a shrewd operator who ruled by fear 
and manipulation ..... [I]n 2014, a report by Fifa's own 
ethics committee had revealed the findings of a Swiss 
court case that showed that millions of dollars in bribes 
had been paid to both Havelange and his former son-in-
law, Ricardo Teixeira, who was also a member of Fifa's 
executive committee. 70 
77 
Blatter was elected FIFA president in June 1998, 
succeeding Havelange, who became Honorary FIFA President. 71 
Blatter, Havelange and Havelange's former son-in-law, Ricardo 
Teixeira, the President of the Brazilian Football Association from 1989 
until 2012 and a member of the FIFA Executive Committee, have each 
been previously connected to a scandal involving International Sports 
and Leisure ("ISL"), a Swiss marketing company which purchased the 
rights to broadcast FIFA events as well as other sports related events. 72 
Swiss legal proceedings in 2008 revealed that the bribes uncovered in 
a Swiss investigation exceeded $100 million, 73 just for the period 1989 
to 1999.74 
Upon Havelange's death in August 2016 the Times of London ran 
its story under the headline - "Havelange, father of Fifa corruption, 
dies aged 100."75 Having learned his ethics and management style from 
Havelange, Blatter was elected and reelected President of FIFA a total 
of five times between 1998 and 2015. 76 Blatter's seventeen years as 
the dominant power in global football have been described as a "never-
ending governance crisis,"77 and Blatter himself has been characterized 
70. Joiio Havelange, supra note 69. 
71. Joiio Havelange, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/the-president/joao-
havelange.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). 
72. David Bond, The £66m 'Bribe' Shadow Hanging over Fifa, TELEGRAPH (March 13, 
2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co. uk/sport/columnists/davidbond/2294323/The-
66m-bribe-shadow-hanging-over-Fifa.html. 
73. Id. 
74. ISL had declared bankruptcy in 2001. Jakob Staun, The fall of ISL, PLAY THE GAME 
(Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2006/the-fall-of-isl/. 
75. Ziegler, supra note 68. 
76. Sophie Gilbert, Another Term for Soccer's Most Powerful Man, THE ATLANTIC (May 
29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2015/05/sepp-blatter-wins-fifa-
election/3944 78/. 
77. Antoine Duval, The Rules of the Game: The Need for Transparency in Sports 
Governance, PLAY GAME (Jan. 7, 2016), 
http://www. p laythegame.org/news/comments/20 l 6/034_the-rules-of-the-game-the-need-for-
transparency-in-sports-govemance/. 
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as "a most successful non-homicidal dictator."78 Blatter's reign was 
marked by a steady stream of internal and external investigations into 
embezzlement and bribery, culminating in allegations of vote buying 
in the selection of Russia and Qatar to host the 2018 and 2022 World 
Cups. 79 Of the twenty-two FIFA Executive Committee members who 
voted to choose Russia and Qatar in 2010, at least half have been 
accused of corruption related to the process. 80 Such is FIFA' s recent 
operating history. 
2. FIFA's Reaction to Decades of Corrupt Activities in the 
Game 
As discussed in Section IV.C.2, there are few Swiss laws 
applicable to FIF A. 81 The consequences of the absence of national laws 
or other authorities or constituencies with some power to impose 
accountability on FIFA have been stark. For example, with no 
accountability, it took a century, until October 2004, for FIFA to create 
its first Ethics Code! 82 One might imagine that, while it may have been 
a century in coming, the adoption of the FIFA Ethics Code was a 
positive, progressive step in the process of curtailing football's 
tradition of misdeeds. As will be demonstrated, however, FIFA's 
Ethics Code has served principally as a fa<;ade behind which FIFA 
corruption thrives, a good-looking prop in FIF A's corporate 
governance charade. 
The FIFA Ethics Code states that it "shall apply to conduct that 
damages the integrity and reputation of football and in particular to 
illegal, immoral and unethical behavior."83 Conveniently, however, it 
applies solely "to all officials and players as well as match and players' 
agents who are bound by this Code on the day the infringement is 
78. Marina Hyde, Sepp Blatter's Limp Challengers Reveal Him as the World's Best 
Dictator, GUARDIAN (Jan 21, 2015, 6:27 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2015/jan/21 /sepp-b latter-challengers-dictator -
marina-hyde. 
79. Vivienne Walt, Russia and Qatar's World Cups Under Scrutiny after FIFA Chief 
Resigns, TIME (June 3, 2015), http://time.com/3906882/fifa-russia-qatar/. 
80. Tariq Panja et al., A League of His Own: How Sepp Blatter Controls Soccer, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-sepp-blatter-fifa/. 
81. See discussion infra Section IV.C.2. 
82. HANS-JOACHIM ECKERT, STATEMENT CHAIRMAN OF THE FIFA ADJUDICATORY 
CHAMBER ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ISL CASE (2013), 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovemance/02/06/60/80/islreportec 
kert29.04.13e.pdf. 
83. FIFA, FIFA CODE OF ETHICS art. (2012), 
http://resources.ftfa.com/mm/ document/affederation/admin istration/ 50/02/82/codeofethics_ v 
211015_e_neutral.pdf. 
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committed."84 Thus, a misdeed, such as payment by or receipt of a 
bribe by a FIFA official, should be covered. In practice, when a party 
is subject to the FIFA Ethics Code and an "infringement" is likely to 
be established, the person subject to the Code simply resigns from his 
football position thus making the Code no longer applicable. In such 
cases, FIFA may simply note that any action by FIFA would be 
"superfluous. "85 
Even so, we reasonably might expect that at least since 2004 the 
Ethics Code could have had a positive impact. In practice, the Ethics 
Committee imposes meaningless sanctions, occasionally "banning 
from football" an official caught red-handed who does not resign. 86 
And it almost always the case that a corrupt act FIFA itself should have 
detected if it had implemented modem corporate governance practices, 
must be made public by others before FIFA will act. 87 
Throughout Blatter's years as President, FIFA had a tragic history 
of involvement in scandals and allegations of bribery and corruption. 88 
As these allegations became public, FIFA did "respond," but not with 
fundamental changes that dealt with the underlying problems. Rather, 
FIFA's responses, proclaimed with positive-sounding press releases, 
were calculated to assuage public outrage. FIFA' s long experience in 
84. Id. art. 2. 
85. One of many recent examples occurred in 2013 when the FIFA Ethics Committee 
was looking into tens of millions in bribes that had been allegedly received by former FIFA 
President Havelange, his former son-in-law, Ricardo Teixeira and Dr. Nicolas Leoz, another 
FIFA official, between 1992 and 2000. The facts had been established in Swiss Government 
proceedings of the Department of Public Prosecutions of the Canton ofZug. After reviewing 
these facts, the Adjudicative Chamber of the Ethics Committee issued a Statement dated April 
29, 2013, which included the following finding: "I note that Mr. Havelange resigned from his 
position as Honorary President effective from 18.04.2013 and that Dr. Nicolas Leoz resigned 
from his positions as a FIFA Executive Committee member, as a FIFA standing committee 
member and as CONMEBOL President effective from 24.04.2013. Hence, any further steps 
or suggestions are superfluous." ECKERT, supra note 82, at 8. Teixeira and Leoz are charged 
in the Indictment. Superseding Indictment, supra note 19, at 1. 
86. INDEPENDENT ETHICS COMMITTEE ADJUDICATORY CHAMBER, INDEPENDENT ETHICS 
COMMITTEE BANS FOOTBALL OFFICIALS (Dec. 8, 2016), 
http://www.fifa.com/ govemance/news/y=2016/m= l 2/news=independent-ethics-committee-
bans-footbal 1-officials-2859090 .html. 
87. One such example relates to the 2006 World Cup hosted by Germany which allegedly 
was chosen over South Africa in a vote that may have involved an $8million bribe. Ten years 
later, FIFA imposed a one year suspension from football on the former President of the 
German Football Association, Wolfgang Niersbach. Fifa hands one-year ban to former DFB 
president Wolfgang Niersbach, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2016, 9:58 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/footbal 1/2016/jul/25/fifa-ban-dtb-president-wolfgang-
niersbach. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
88. See, e.g., Mikhail Reider-Gordon, Money Laundering, Corruption and the World 
Cup: In the Wake of Brazil 2014, 21 Sw. J. INT'L L. 97 (2014); Roger Peilke Jr., How Can 
FIFA Be Held Accountable?, 16 SPORT MGMT. REv. 255 (2013). 
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addressing public outrage by announcing highly visible, entirely 
ineffective maneuvers makes clear that FIFA has developed an 
elaborate "Corruption Crisis Playbook" of responses to various 
categories of corruption, such as bribes, match-fixing, money 
laundering, outrageous squandering of FIFA funds, etc. Indeed, FIFA 
has proudly and loudly announced uncountable investigations, policy 
statements, reform announcements, study commissions, solutions 
subcommittees, and, recently its simultaneous task forces: the Task 
Force Ethics Committee; the Task Force Revision of Statutes; the Task 
Force Transparency & Compliance; as well as an Independent 
Governance Committee.89 As we shall see, such reactions to publicly 
revealed corruption have been window dressing, not a single one of which 
has had a meaningful impact on the pervasive culture of corruption which 
continues to be the lifeblood of football.90 
FIFA' s century of corruption has arisen and flourished in the 
unique, protective culture of Swiss hospitality to sports crime, where 
FIFA is accountable to no one anywhere. Although domiciled in 
Switzerland, FIFA acts in many ways as a supranational entity with 
the impunity a sovereign nation possesses. The WashinRton Post has 
described FIFA as "notoriously corrupt and yet seemingly 
invincible. 91 " Others have observed: 
Somehow, the organization has maneuvered itself into 
a position where none of its members can really be 
prosecuted for much of anything they do under FIFA 
auspices, much as some institutions might try. 
Headquartered in Zurich, the organization has 
immunity under Swiss law and creates a state-within-
a-state when it puts on World Cups, ensuring an 
equivalent to the protection from local law that 
diplomats enjoy. 92 
89. See discussion infra Section III. 
90. See Superseding Indictment, supra note 19. (detailing corruption within Cobcacaf, 
Comeboland, afdroican, Asian and European football associations). See, e.g., FINANCIAL 
ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH THE FOOTBALL SECTOR (2009), See also 
GOLDBLATT supra note 27. 
91. Christopher Ingraham, The Toll of Human Causalities in Qatar, WASH POST (May 
27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/20 I 5/05/27 /a-body-count-in-
qatar-illustrates-the-consequences-of-fifa-corruption/. 
92. Leander Schaerlaeckens, Sepp Blatter and His World of Corruption Detailed in New 
Bloomberg Expos, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 30, 2015, 3:38 PM), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/soccer-fc-yahoo/sepp-blatter-and-his-world-of-corruption-
detailed-in-new-bloomberg-businessweek-expos-233- I 93808707 .html. See also, infra 
Section IV.D.1 (discussing an investigation of more than $100,000,000 in bribes which a 
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D. A Pair of Stunning Decisions 
At least since 1984 the FIFA Executive Committee had 
announced the nation selected to host its quadrennial World Cup 
competitions six years in advance, giving the host country time to 
prepare for the event.93 Under Blatter this process was changed to 
permit the FIFA Executive Committee to award both the 2018 and the 
2022 World Cups in 2010.94 
FIFA conducted a due diligence investigation of each of the 
nations seeking to host the World Cup. England, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Russia sought to host the 2018 
World Cup, while Australia, Japan, Qatar, South Korea and the United 
States were considered by FIFA for the 2022 World Cup.95 FIFA rated 
each of these potential host nations "low risk" except Russia, which 
was "medium risk," and Qatar, which was "high risk."96 Despite this, 
on December 2, 2010 FIFA announced that its Executive Committee 
had selected Russia and Qatar to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups.97 
One commentator has noted that these choices "could reasonably be 
described as having stunned nearly everyone."98 
Russia is the largest country in the world by land area, but ranks 
119th out of 168 nations rated in Transparency International's 
Corruption Perceptions Index.99 Russia has a long football tradition 
with many teams actively competing and there can be no doubt that 
football is a major sport there. By contrast, Qatar, the 2022 host, is 
slightly smaller than Connecticut and has fewer than 2 million 
residents. 100 Qatar does not have a strong football tradition, no team 
from Qatar has ever qualified for World Cup play and Qatar has no 
Swiss Prosecutor found did not violate Swiss law and which could not be pursued under the 
FIFA Ethics Code, which had not been adopted at that time). 
93. See Superseding Indictment, supra note 19. 
94. See FIFA, supra note 8, art. 25.2(s). 
95. FIFA EVALUATION GRP., EVALUATION REPORTS ON THE BIDS FOR THE2018 AND 2022 
FIFA WORLD CUPS (2010), 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/competition/01/33/59/45/bid_evaluation_rep 
ort_l911.pdf. 
96. Id.at 9. 
97. Russia and Qatar to host 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, respectively, FIFA (Dec. 
2, 2010), http:/ /www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=201O/m=l2/news=russia-and-qatar-host-
20 l 8-and-2022-fifa-world-cups-respectively-1344971.html. 
98. Reider-Gordon, supra note 88, at 104. 
99. Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2017). 
100. World Fact Book, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-
world-factbook/geos/qa.html. 
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indigenous football fan base. Daytime temperatures in the summer, the 
traditional time of year for scheduling the World Cup, often exceed 120 
degrees Fahrenheit. 101 
The stunning announcement of the 2018 and 2022 World Cup hosts 
generated a media maelstrom. When the criticism of FIFA for these two 
choices did not abate, FIFA opened its well-worn "Corruption Crisis 
Playbook" and, as detailed in Section III, treated the media to a number 
of "much trumpeted reforms. "102 
E. The Department of Justice Indictments 
The Department of Justice investigation into FIFA apparently 
began in 2010103 and proceeded for five years prior to the May 2015 
announcement of the first indictment. 104 Two senior football 
executives, Charles Blazer and Jose Hawilla are now known to have 
made secret plea deals and "cooperated" with the Department of 
Justice, for several years. 105 
On May 27, 2015, Swiss authorities, at the request of the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, conducted an early morning raid at 
Zurich's luxury Baur au Lac hotel106 where senior FIFA officials from 
around the world had gathered for FIFA' s annual Congress being held 
to elect the FIFA President. After the arrest of seven senior FIFA 
officials in Zurich and a raid on CONCACAF offices in Miami, Florida 
later the same day, United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch 
convened a press conference in New York where she revealed a forty-
seven count indictment charging football officials, largely from the 
Western Hemisphere football confederations, CONCACAF and 
101. FIFA EVALUATION GRP., 2022 FIFA WORLD Cur™ BID EVALUATION REPORT: 
QATAR 24 (2010), 
http://www. fi fa.com/mm/ document/toumament/competition/O I /3 3/7 4/56/b9qate.pdf. 
I 02. See discussion infra Section III. 
103. Will Leitch, The World Cup of Corruption, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2016, 3:56 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-world-cup-of-corruption-1464 3 79006. 
I 04. Andrew Martin & Tariq Panja, Former Westchester Soccer Dad at Core of Sprawling 
FIFA Case, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015, 2:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/former-westchester-soccer-dad-at-
core-of-sprawling-fifa-scandal. 
105. Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering 
Conspiracy and Corruption, supra note 22. 
I 06. Consistent with FIF A's practice of enjoying life to the fullest at others' expense, senior 
FIFA officials enjoyed the $4000 per night hospitality at the Baur au Lac hotel. The dawn raid 
by Swiss authorities was labeled the "Five-Star Takedown" in the press. Vernon Silver et al., 
FIFA Busts at Baur au Lac: Inside the Five-Star Takedown, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015, 10:57 
AM), http://www. b loomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0 5-2 7 /fifa-busts-at-baur-au-lac-inside-
soccer-s-five-star-takedown. 
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CONMEBOL, with numerous crimes, including $150,000,000 in 
bribes paid over a period of twenty-four years. 107 The charges included 
"RICO" counts (the Racketeering hrlluenced Criminal Organizations 
Act), 108 plus wire fraud, 109 money laundering, 110 conspiracy to effect wire 
fraud 111 and among other offenses. 112 Lynch also announced that the 
Department of Justice had already secured guilty pleas from four 
individuals and two corporate legal entities. 113 Blatter, who was 
seeking reelection to his fifth four-year term at the FIFA Congress, was 
not named in the indictment. He was reelected to his fifth four-year 
term two days after the raids, arrests and release of the indictment. 114 
Within a week, however, Blatter announced he would resign once an 
Extraordinary FIFA Congress 115 elected a new President in February 
2016. 116 
On December 3, 2015, on the occasion of a Zurich meeting of the 
FIFA Executive Committee, Swiss police, acting on behalf of the 
Department of Justice, once again raided the Baur au Lac hotel, 
arresting two additional FIFA officials. That same day the ninety-two 
count superseding Indictment117 was unsealed in New York, bringing 
the total number of individual and corporate defendants charged to 
forty-one. 118 
107. Edward Malnick et al., FBI charts 24 years of football's bribery and corruption, 
TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2015, 10:14 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co. uk/sport/footbal l/fifa/11634 704/FBI-charts-24-years-of-footballs-
bribery-and-corruption.html. 
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2012). 
109. Id. §§1343, 2 and 3551 et seq. 
110. Id. §§1956(a)(2)(A), 2 and 3551 et seq. 
111. Id. §§1349, 3551 et seq. 
112. Id. §§1956(h), 3551 et seq. 
113. Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering 
Conspiracy and Corruption, supra note 22. 
114. Owen Gibson, Sepp Blatter to Resign as Fifa President After 17 Years in Role, 
GUARDIAN (June 2, 2015, 3 :28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jun/02/sepp-
b latter -fi fa-president-resigns. 
115. An Extraordinary FIFA Congress may by convened by the Council "at any time." 
"The Council shall convene an Extraordinary Congress if one-fifth (115) of the member 
associations make such a request in writing. The request shall specify the items for the agenda. 
An Extraordinary Congress shall be held within three months of receipt of the request." FIFA, 
FIFA STATUTES (Apr. ed. 2016), 
http://www. fi fa.com/mm/Document/ AFF ederation/Generic/02/78/2 9107 IFIF AStatutswebEN 
_Neutral.pdf. 
116. Gibson, supra note 114. 
117. Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering 
Conspiracy and Corruption, supra note 22. 
118. See Bruce W. Bean, An Interim Essay on FIFA 's World Cup of Corruption: The 
Desperate Need for International Corporate Governance Standards at FIFA, 22 ILSA J. INT' L 
84 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:68 
II. CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE 
Part II reviews modem developments in corporate governance 
generally as well as specific efforts made in recent decades to reduce 
bribery and corruption in international business. The lack of success of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCP A") and similar laws in other 
nations designed to reduce bribery in international business is noted, 
and FIFA' s current governance status is described 
A. Recent Changes to Standards of International Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate governance has developed in connection with the 
conduct of for-profit corporations. Full disclosure, transparency, 
independence, gender equality, board refreshment, tenure limits, 
related party transactions, codes of ethics, sustainability and diversity 
are some of the more important concepts that have developed in the 
nearly five decades since Milton Friedman made "corporate social 
responsibility," a key corporate buzzword. 119 
Corporate governance can be successful where there is 
accountability. FIF A's stakeholders (i.e. its teams, fans, national 
associations, continental confederations and sponsors), however, have 
been perfectly unsuccessful in pressuring local football associations or 
FIFA itself to effectively reform football. One reason certainly is that 
there is no obvious means of doing so. Another may be acceptance of 
the way FIFA always operated as "normal." In any case, we do know 
that fans everywhere can be uncritically loyal to "their" team. 
B. Anti-Bribery Laws Affecting For-Profit Corporations 
FIFA is the quintessential international enterprise. Former FIFA 
President Joao Havelange was fond of comparing the international 
scope of FIFA with the United Nations and noting that the three major 
powers in the world were the United States, the Soviet Union and 
FIFA! 120 Whether FIFA is seen as a supranational organization akin to 
the United Nations or merely as a Swiss non-governmental 
organization administering a vast, multibillion dollar global enterprise, 
it is clear that FIFA has not adopted the necessary modem mechanisms 
of corporate governance required to properly manage football. This is 
true despite decades of public awareness of FIFA' s self-dealing and 
& COMP. L. 367, 369 (2016). 
119. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 32 (Sept. 13, 1970). 
120. Ziegler, supra note 68. 
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corrupt practices making manifest the need to reform FIFA. 
The American practice of attempting to clean up world-wide 
corruption can be dated to 1977, when President Jimmy Carter signed 
the FCPA. 121 The FCPA is one of the legacies of President Nixon's 
Watergate crisis. 122 The FCPA criminalizes payments to foreign 
officials when made to "obtain or retain business." As the result of 
extensive diplomatic efforts by the United States, twenty years after 
the appearance of the FCP A, the nations of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (the "OECD") finally 
produced the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the "OECD 
Convention"). The OECD Convention establishes obligations for 
parties to create national laws nearly identical to the FCP A. This 
Convention has been adopted by all OECD nations, including 
Switzerland, as well as six other nations, however, neither the FCP A 
nor the OECD Convention and the national laws adopted pursuant 
thereto have had any discernible impact on corruption. 123 
121. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, amended 
by Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-03, 102 
Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78m(b)(3), 78dd-l, 
78dd-2, 78ff(l994)). 
122. Bruce W. Bean, Hyperbole, Hypocrisy, and Hubris in the Aid-Corruption Dialogue, 
41 GEO J. INT'L L. 781, 800-01 (2010). See Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of 
Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269 (1998). 
123. Corruption laws have certainly been good for lawyers, having created an entire 
industry referred to by Professor Michael Koehler and the Wall Street Journal as "FCPA Inc." 
but bribery and corruption have not been reduced. In addition to the benefits to government 
attorneys who later join private practice, the anti-corruption industry has created the prominent 
anti-corruption non-governmental organization, Transparency International ("Tl"), founded in 
Berlin in 1993, and which now has operations in more than 100 countries. TI has as its vision 
of"a world in which government, business, civil society and the daily Jives of people are free 
of corruption." The 2016 TI "Corruption Perceptions Index" begins by noting that 114 
countries of the 168 rated score so low on this Index that TI concludes these nations have 
"serious levels of public sector corruption." The many billions of dollars expended to address 
corruption over the past forty years have simply not produced perceptible progress toward 
creating Tl's world "free of corruption." Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, supra note 99. 
See, e.g., Friday Roundup, FCP A PROFESSOR (July 15, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/friday-
roundup-l 97 /#more-19643. Consistent with the typical career path of DOJ FCP A 
enforcement attorneys, former DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Patrick Stokes is joining FCPA Inc. As 
noted in a Gibson Dunn release, Stokes is joining the firm as a partner. Former Senior DOJ 
White Collar Prosecutor, Patrick Stokes, Joins Gibson Dunn in Washington, D.C., GIBSON 
DUNN (July 5, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/news/Pages/Former-Senior-DOJ-White-
Collar-Prosecutor-Patrick-Stokes-Joins-Gibson-Dunn-in-Washington-DC.aspx. I have long 
suggested a prohibition on DOJ (or SEC) FCPA enforcement attorneys with supervisory and 
discretionary authority from providing FCP A defense or compliance services for five years 
upon leaving government service. Indeed, the legitimacy and credibility of the DOJ and SEC's 
entire FCP A enforcement programs hinge on this policy proposal being adopted. See Mike 
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In the not-for-profit realm where FIFA thrives, there has been no 
meaningful attempt and absolutely no progress in curtailing corrupt 
behavior. This is true even in the United States, the global leader in 
anti-corruption rhetoric and prosecutions. No efforts have been made 
to address lack of accountability and waste in not-for-profit entities. 
The recent experience of the American National Red Cross in Haiti 
starkly makes this point. 124 
C. FIFA and Corporate Governance 
FIFA has grown into a billion-dollar enterprise, and has done so 
without developing the internal governance mechanisms essential to 
monitor and preclude the self-dealing and other forms of corruption 
Koehler, Lanny Breuer and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 8 WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME REP. 204 (2013); Law Profs Seek to Jam the Revolving Door, 25 CORP. CRIME REP. 3 
(2011). In the above release, Stokes tenure as FCPA Unit Chief is measured quantitatively 
("I I corporate FCPA resolutions with penalties of about $1.3 billion, including the largest 
criminal FCP A fine and two of the I 0 largest criminal FCP A resolutions to date ... "). See also 
For-Profit Public Enforcement, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 11, 2015), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/for-profit-public-enforcement/ (providing further discussion on this 
common metric of measuring DOJ enforcement attorneys). See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, FCPA 
Inc.: The Business of Bribery: Corruption Probes Become Profit Center for Big Law Firms, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB I 00008723963904438626045780284622946 l l 352; Our 
Organisation, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, https://www.transparency.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 
2017). It is of course quite difficult to accurately measure corruption. Indeed, we are more 
likely to learn the alleged details of the sex lives of the rich and famous than to know facts 
about their finances. See Bruce W. Bean & Abbey L. Wright, The Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act: American Legal Imperialism, 21 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333, 336 (2015). 
124. Memorandum from Senator Chuck Grassley to Members of the Senate Judiciary and 
Finance Committees (June 15, 2016), 
http://www.grassley. senate. gov /sites/default/fi les/constituents/2016-06-
l 5 %20Senator%20Grassley%20Red%20Cross%20 Inquiry. pdf. As for corruption in politics, 
no one actually expects politicians not to lie, obfuscate and "promise a bridge, even where 
there is no river." While we may wish for better, few expect political corruption to be 
addressed seriously in legislation successful politicians themselves must enact. In the United 
States this is so because, while politicians are nominally "accountable" to their constituents, 
our tradition remains that more than 90% of incumbents are reelected to Congress. This is true 
even when, as now, the approval rating for Congress as a whole is at 15% or less. As a result, 
because there is no accountability, or as John Wooden said, "When no one is watching," men 
succumb to the moral hazard of acting without concern for the consequences. Chris Cillizza, 
People Hate Congress. But Most Incumbents Get Re-elected. What Gives?, WASH. POST, (May 
9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/05/09/people-hate-
congress-but-most-incumbents-get-re-elected-what-gives/. In the November 2016 U.S. 
elections, five seats in the 435 Member House of Representatives, and two in the I 00 Member 
Senate changed parties. Louis Jacobson, Congress Has 11% Approval Ratings but 96% 
Incumbent Reelection Rate, Meme Says, PoLITIFACT (Nov, 11, 2014, 4:56 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/nov I 11 /facebook-posts/congress-
has- l 1-approval-ratings-96-incumbent-re-e/. See also Reelection Rates Over the Years, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/reelect.php (last visited Aug. 5, 
2017) (providing a graphical representation of reelection rate over the years). 
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now plaguing football. As one of the world's largest multinational 
enterprises, FJF A has 211 members 125 representing countries and 
territories where football is played. FJF A has also expanded its reach 
and now is responsible for futsal, an indoor football game, as well as 
international beach volleyball. 126 
Football, starting with FJFA, urgently requires implementation of 
the standards of corporate governance that have developed over the past 
twenty-five years in the commercial world. We should appreciate that 
for decades FJF A was a small, insignificant entity overseeing the rules 
for football and coordinating the events leading up to its World Cup. 
Under Havelange and Blatter FJF A grew phenomenally. Sports 
sponsorships and TV broadcast rights brought billions to FJF A. FJF A's 
current staff exceeds 200 and its financial reports indicate a retained 
surplus of more than $1.3 billion. 127 But both FJF A and football across 
the globe retain their antiquated practices and procedures for selecting 
leaders, controlling funds and conducting business. While the business 
of football developed under Havelange and Blatter, its management has 
not. FJF A and football now exist as demonstrative evidence of how not 
to permit a multibillion dollar business to operate. 
One indication of how FJF A and football have not evolved, despite 
the great changes in football economics over recent decades, appears in 
the Indictment. Of those charged in the Indictment, only three are under 
fifty years of age (and these are sons of indicted FJF A officials) fifteen 
are now over seventy years old and three are over eighty; Blatter 
himself turned eighty in early 2017. 128 Many FJF A senior officials have 
enjoyed football leadership roles for decades. Blatter had been with 
FJF A for forty years before being banned in 2016. 129 Another 
defendant, Jack Warner from Trinidad & Tobago was a FJFA Vice 
President and Member of its Executive Committee for twenty-eight 
years, until 2011 when he escaped all FJF A sanctions for bribery and 
other charges by resigning. 130 The former Argentine superstar, Diego 
125. The United Nations has just 193 members. Growth in United Nations membership, 
1945-present, UNITED NA TIO NS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-
united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). 
126. FIFA, supra note 8, art. 7. 
127. FIFA reported reserves of $1,340,000 at the end of 2015. 66rn FIFA CONGRESS, 
supra note 20. 
128. Sepp Blatter timeline: Fifa president's controversial career, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 25, 
2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.telegraph.eo.uk/sport/football/sepp-blatter/11891813/Sepp-
Blatter-timeline-Fifa-presidents-controversial-career.html. 
129. Id. 
130. Ben Rumsby, Fifa scandal: Jack Warner Banned for life, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 29, 2015, 
12:54 PM), http://www.telegraph.eo.uk/sport/football/fifa/11898608/Fifa-scandal-Jack-
88 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:68 
Maradona, has referred to FIFA officials as "dinosaurs who do not 
want to relinquish power" highlighting that it is not at all obvious that 
the former football players who have presided over FIFA for decades 
have the background or expertise to deal with managing the 
multinational, multibillion dollar enterprise football has become131 
III. "Is IT MADNESS TO BELIEVE FIFA CAN REFORM ITSELF?" 
A prominent international expert on anti-corruption and corporate 
governance has asked, "[i]s it madness to think FIFA can reform 
itself?"132 Given FIF A's decades of scandals, highlighted most 
recently by the Indictment, the straight answer is "Yes, it is mad to 
believe in self-reform at FIFA!" 
There is an incontrovertible need to impose the highest standards 
of international corporate governance on FIFA and football. FIFA' s 
unending scandals confirm the total absence of any semblance of such 
governance standards at FIFA. Much worse is the stark evidence, 
outlined in Sections IV and V, of FIFA' s open hostility to changes in 
the FIFA culture, a culture of corruption that includes its President, 
Executive Council, continental confederations and individual national 
football associations. 
A. Corporate Governance under Blatter - a Charade? a Comedy? 
a Farce? - a Tragedy! 
A brief review of scandals while FIFA was under Blatter's 
leadership demonstrates not only the woefully inadequate state of 
corporate governance at FIFA but also the conclusion that all FIFA 
"reforms" have been part of an elaborate charade to make FIF A's 
leaders look good while enabling them to continue to act "Just for Us." 
1. The 2006 World Cup - Germany 
In July 2000, two years after Blatter succeeded Havelange as 
FIFA President, bidding for the right to host the 2006 World Cup was 
Warner-to-be-banned-for-life.html. 
131. FIFA has failed to develop the systems that modem for-profit public corporations have 
been required to implement to monitor and insure that its funds and activities comply with both 
applicable law and institutional best practices. Tom Killeen, Is FIFA Finally Finished?, 
YORKER (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.theyorker.co.uk/sport/fifa-finally-finished/; Top IO List 
of the Internet World's Most Popular Sports, TOPEND SPORTS, 
http://www.topendsports.com/world/Iists/popular-sport/fans.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). 
132. Symposium: Corruption in International Sports, U. MD. CAREY SCHOOL OF L. (Oct. 
21, 2016). 
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held; Germany was selected over South Africa by a twelve to eleven 
vote of the FJF A Executive Committee. 133 In October 2015, four 
months after the first Department of Justice Indictment and 
accompanying arrests became public, Germany's Der Spiegel charged 
that a "slush fund" had been created fifteen years earlier by the head 
of Adidas, the German sports gear retailer and long-time FJF A 
sponsor, in order to pay the bribes necessary to insure Germany was 
selected. 134 After the usual run of "we never paid a bribe," "everything 
was done with honest means,"135 followed by explanations, "well, yes 
we paid the $8,000,000, but it was not a bribe", 136 an investigation was 
commenced by the FJF A Ethics Committee in March 2016, sixteen 
years after the alleged bribe was, or was not, paid. 137 In July 2016 
FJF A "acted" by banning the sixty-five year-old Vice Chair of the 
Organizing Committee that won the bid for Germany in 2000, 
Wolfgang Niersbach, from football for one year. 138 
2. The 2010 World Cup - South Africa 
Although South Africa lost the designation as host of the 2006 
World Cup to Germany, it was selected to host the 2010 World Cup. 139 
South Africa allegedly arranged for a $10,000,000 bribe to secure the 
votes required to be selected to host the 2010 World Cup. 140 Danny 
Jordaan, CEO of the South African World Cup Organizing Committee 
133. Host nation of 2010 FIFA World Cup - South Africa, FIFA (May 15, 2004), 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2004/m=5/news=host-nation-20 l 0-fifa-world-cuptm-
south-africa-92544.html. 
134. Germany Appears to Have Bought Right to Host 2006 Tournament, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
(Oct. 16, 2015, 5: 10 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/documents-indicate-
slush-fund-used-in-german-world-cup-bid-a- l 058212.html. 
135. Id. 
136. Marissa Payne, Germany Says It Didn't Bribe FIFA Officials for 2006 World Cup, 
but Its Explanation Is Shaky, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earl y-lead/wp/20151101231 germany-says-it-didnt-
bribe-fi fa-officials-for-2006-world-cup-but-its-exp lanation-is-
shaky/?utm_term= .384495c9c9e6. 
137. Andrew Soergel, German Soccer Star Swept Up in Corruption Allegations, U.S. 
NEWS (Mar. 22, 2016, 12:08 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-03-22/der-
kaiser-franz-beckenbauer-latest-swept-up-in-fifa-corruption-probe. 
138. Fifa hands one-year ban to former DFB president Wolfgang Niersbach, supra note 
87. 
139. Jere Longman, SOCCER; South Africa Is Names Host of 2010 World Cup, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 16, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/16/sports/soccer-south-africa-is-
named-host-of-2010-world-cup.html? _r=O. 
140. Daniel Rivero, How South Africa's Bid To Host The 2010 World Cup Was Allegedly 
Built On Bribes, FUSION TV (May 27, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://fusion.net/story/140533/how-
south-africas-bid-to-host-the-2010-world-cup-was-allegedly-built-on-bribes/. 
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is said to have been involved. 141 As with Germany for the 2006 World 
Cup, the story ran that "the bribe was not paid," 142 or "the money paid 
was not a bribe,"143 or "yes, it was paid, but it was authorized by the 
governrnent." 144 In March 2016, after more than ten years had passed 
FIFA confirmed that a bribe had been paid. 145 
3. Blatter's Response to the 2010 Furor: the "Roadmap to 
Reform" 
In the media storm that followed the December 2010 decision to 
have Russia and Qatar host the World Cups in 2018 and 2022, Sepp 
Blatter choreographed an elaborate series of highly publicized 
"reform" initiatives. Following his June 2011 reelection as FIFA 
President, Blatter unveiled a "Roadmap to FIFA Good Governance."146 
His "Roadmap" included a broad array of very public steps designed 
to demonstrate institutional renewal at FIF A. 147 Blatter's multi-
pronged "reform" effort involved Transparency International, the 
Basel Institute of Governance and internal "task forces." 148 Each group 
was asked to address internal corporate governance at FIFA. After 
much FIFA-generated sound and fury, we find there was very little 
effective reform. 
4. Transparency Intern~tional's "Safe Hands" Report 
Blatter invited Transparency International ("TI"), a world leader 
in tracking and addressing global corruption, to propose changes in 
FIF A's governance practices. TI prepared a corporate governance 
reform report entitled "Safe Hands: Building Integrity and 
141. Id. 
142. Morena Mothupi, First on EWN: Danny Jordaan Denies FIFA Corruption Claims, 
Defends Linda Mti, EYEWITNESS NEWS (June 26, 2016), http://ewn.co.za/2016/06/29/First-on-
EWN-Danny-Jordaan-denies-corruption-allegations-defends-Linda-Mti. 
143. Rivero, supra note 140. 
144. Jordaan Knew About $10m, but Denies Bribery, ENCA (June 1, 2015), 
https ://www .enca.com/south-africa/jordaan-knew-about-1 Om-denies-bribery. 
145. Jean Smyth, FIFA Confirms 2010 Wold Cup Bribes Were Paid, EYEWITNESS NEWS 
(Mar. 16, 2016), http://ewn.co.za/2016/03/16/Fifa-confirms-2010-World-Cup-bribes-were-
paid. 
146. PROPOSALS BY THE FIFA PRESIDENT FOLLOWING THE 61ST FIFA CONGRESS 2011 IN 
ZURICH (Oct. 21, 2011) 
147. Id. 
148. These were: a Task Force Ethics Committee, a Task Force Revision of Statutes, and 
a Task Force Transparency & Compliance. Each of these was led by a FIFA insider. FIFA 
Executive Committee Agrees Major Governance Reforms & Ethics Structure, FIFA (Mar. 30, 
2012), http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=20 l 2/m=3/news=fifa-executive-committee-
agrees-maj or-govemance-reforms-ethics-structur-16085 5 3. html. 
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Transparency at FIFA. " 149 The TI report proposed a list of standard 
governance measures: independent investigations of all past corruption 
allegations; clear rules going forward regarding whistle blowing and 
investigations by the FIFA Ethics Committee; 150 steps to insure 
transparency and good governance; term limits for senior officials; a 
conflict of interest policy; and independent members on crucial 
committees such as the FIFA Ethics Committee. 
TI also proposed that in the absence of FIFA accountability to a 
higher authority, an oversight group composed of various stakeholders 
should be created. 151 Such a body would be totally independent of 
FIFA and could be composed of representatives of fans, football 
federations, women's football, sponsors, players, referees, etc. TI 
cited the experience of the International Olympic Committee which 
created a reform group in the wake of the bribery scandal relating to 
the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah. 152 
5. Basel Institute of Governance 
In August 2011 Blatter requested that Mark Pieth, a professor at 
the Basel Institute of Governance, propose corporate governance 
reforms for FIFA. 153 Pieth has substantial experience and an 
outstanding international reputation as an expert on bribery, 
corruption, money laundering and related matters. 154 Pieth submitted 
a report to FIFA in September 2011 entitled "Governing FIFA: 
149. TRANSPARENCY lNT'L, SAFE HANDS: BUILDING INTEGRITY AND TRANSPARENCY AT 
FIFA (2011). 
150. A FIFA Ethics Committee was established under Blatter in June 2006, apparently to 
address issues relating to bribery of referees in Italy and elsewhere. This Ethics Committee 
replaced an earlier FIFA committee, the Committee for Ethics and Fair Play, which was 
renamed the Committee for Fair Play and Social Responsibility at the FIFA Congress held in 
Munich in June 2006. 57TH FIFA CONGRESS, ACTIVITY REPORT 2007 (2007). 
151. TRANSPARENCY INT' L, supra note 149, at 3. 
152. FIFA Acknowledges Report by TI, FIFA (Aug.16, 2011 ), http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/news/y=2011 /m=S/news=fifa-acknowledges-report-1493338.html. As described later in 
this article, this favorable result at the International Olympic Committee came about because 
the U.S. Congress had demanded adoption of these reforms and threatened legislation to 
prevent American companies from supporting the IOC. 
153. Prof Mark Pieth presented as chairman of Independent Governance Committee, 
FIFA (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2011/m=l l/news=prof-
mark-pieth-presented-chairman-independent-governance-committee-1549900.html. 
154. From 1990 through 2013 Professor Pieth was chair of the OECD's Working Group 
on Bribery in International Business Transactions, the group that conducts compliance reviews 
of the parties to the OECD anti-bribery convention. This convention, the "OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions" has 
now been ratified by forty-one nations, including all major trading countries except China. See 
OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS ( 1997). 
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Concept Paper and Report."155 This report notes the growth of FIFA 
from a small private organization that organized matches and the rules 
of the game to a billion dollar commercial entity. 156 Pieth concluded 
that the real authority within FIFA was with the Executive Committee 
and the President and that its internal organizational structure has not 
evolved as FIFA was transformed into an entity with regulatory, 
organizational and commercial functions. 157 
6. FIFA Task Forces158 
In August 2011 Blatter caused FIFA to establish several internal 
task forces: the Task Force Ethics Committee; the Task Force Revision 
of Statutes, and the Task Force Transparency & Compliance. 159 These 
Task Forces, which were staffed by FIFA insiders, coordinated their 
activities with Mark Pieth of the Basel Institute of Governance. 160 At 
the July 2012 FIFA Congress the Ethics Committee was reorganized 
by amending the FIFA Statutes to split the Committee into the 
Investigative Chamber and Adjudicatory Chamber, each to be led by 
"independent" persons. 161 The FIFA Ethics Code was also substantially 
amended. 162 While the previous version of the Ethics Code contained 
twenty-one Articles, 163 the revised 2012 version had eighty-eight 
articles with many nice-sounding words. 164 These were definitely 
good-looking corporate governance measures; but as we shall see, they 
have not had a meaningful impact on FIFA. 
7. The Independent Governance Committee 
One result of the work of the Basel Institute of Governance was 
an agreement with Blatter to create an Independent Governance 
Committee165 ("IGC") to take an in depth look at FIFA, its organization 
155. MARK PJETH, GOVERNING FIFA CONCEPT PAPER AND REPORT, 19 SEPTEMBER 2011 
(2011). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. 57TH FIFA CONGRESS, ACTIVITY REPORT 2007, supra note 150. 
159. A fourth Task Force, "Task Force Football 2014," focused on Laws of the Game, 
refereeing, competition regulations, women's football, medical matters, and fair play. FIFA 
Executive Committee Agrees Major Governance Reforms & Ethics Structure, supra note 148. 
160. See discussion infra Section IV.D.4.c. 
161. Independent Ethics Committee, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/committees/committee= 1882034/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). 
162. FIFA, FIFA CODE OF ETHICS (2012 ed. 2012). 
163. FIFA, FIFA CODE OF ETHICS (2009 ed. 2009). 
164. FIFA CODE OF ETHICS (2012 ed. 2012), supra note 162. 
165. This committee had previously been referred to in FIFA documents as the "solutions 
committee," Mark Pieth to Lead 'solutions committee,' ESPN (Nov. 23, 2011), 
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and procedures and, in connection with FIFA's internal Task Forces, 
to fully consider what further changes FIFA should make. 
The IGC, headed by Mark Pieth, was established in November 
2011. 166 Six of the initial thirteen members of the IGC were nominally 
independent; the remaining seven represented various FIFA 
constituencies, sponsors, players, and the football leagues and 
associations. 167 The IGC adopted a fine-sounding Charter outlining its 
responsibilities. 168 While the Charter referred to the independence of 
the IGC, its authority with respect to corruption was limited. For 
example, Article 2 provides in part: 
FIFA has delegated to the IGC the power and authority 
necessary to discharge its purpose, including but not 
limited to the right to assess FIFA' s response to 
allegations of past and current misconduct, and, if 
appropriate, to recommend further investigation. 169 
"Assessing" past misconduct did not include actually 
investigating allegations of corruption as TI had recommended in its 
"Safe Hands" report. 170 When TI learned that this "independent" 
committee would not be able to look into past reported abuses, that 
FIFA was to pay Committee Members $5000 per day for work on the 
IGC and that as Chairman, Mark Pieth would also be paid an additional 
$128,000, 171 it promptly terminated its participation in this FIFA 
charade. 
The IGC reviewed and assessed the work of the internal FIFA 
Task Forces, the TI "Safe Hand"s report and Mark Pieth's earlier 
http://www.espn.com/sports/soccer/news/_/id/7273272/swiss-professor-mark-pieth-Iead-fifa-
solutions-committee. The committee was also known as the "Committee Good Governance." 
PROPOSALS BY THE FIFA PRESIDENT FOLLOWING THE 6!ST FIFA CONGRESS 201 I IN ZURICH, 
supra note 146. At one point Henry Kissinger was apparently approached to chair this 
committee. Blatter Tips Henry Kissinger for Role on FIFA 'Solutions Committee,' CNN (June 
2, 2011. 9:22 PM), 
http://edition.cnn.com/201 l/SPORT/football/06/02/football.fifa.blatter.kissinger/. 
166. INDEP. GOVERNANCE COMM., FIRST REPORT BY THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNANCE 
COMMJTTEE TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF FIFA (2012). 
167. Id. 
168. Independent Governance Committee Charter, BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140427073630/http://www.baselgovemance.org/gov/govema 
nce-in-sports/fifa/independent-govemance-committee-charter/ (captured Apr. 27, 2014 ). 
169. Id. 
170. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra note 149, at 2. 
171. Parliamentary Questions, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Dec. 20, 2011), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT +WQ+E-20 l l-
0l2045+o+DOC+ XML+ VO//EN. 
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proposals and made a number of its own proposals and 
recommendations. 172 The IGC did not control the FIFA reform 
process, however, and, as we shall see, the IGC was not at all satisfied 
with the results of its two-year effort. 
The IGC published its First Report173 in March 2012, just four 
months after it was organized. In this Report the IGC concluded that, 
even with the narrow scope of its limited authority to assess earlier 
scandals, things were not well. 174 For example, the First Report stated: 
Overall, the answers by FIFA regarding the handling 
of alleged misconduct were not fully satisfactory to 
the IGC. Based on the discussion of specific examples, 
FIFA has - in the opinion of the IGC --- shown a lack 
of pro-active and systematic follow---up on allegations. 
In some instances, allegations were insufficiently 
investigated. 175 
Additionally, the First Report included a number of basic 
recommendations for updating FIF A's organization and processes, 
such as the creation of an Audit & Compliance Committee, adding 
independent chairs of important independent committees and 
including them in Executive Committee meetings, creating term limits, 
and creating financial controls appropriate for a modem billion dollar 
multinational enterprise. 176 
At the FIFA Congress in 2012 a few of these proposals were 
adopted by FIFA. 177 One revealing amendment was a quite modest 
change to the all-male nature of FIFA. Article 30 of the FIFA Statutes 
was amended to add "the Representative of Women's Football" to the 
Executive Committee."178 Described as "the female member" on the 
all-male FIFA Executive Committee, 179 this woman was to be elected 
by the FIFA Congress. 180 While this change in FIFA's organization 
172. INDEP. GOVERNANCE COMM., supra note 166, at 5. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. art. 2.2. 
176. Id. 
1 77. FIFA, supra note 8. 
178. Id. at art. 30.3 (stating "The Representative of Women's Football shall be elected by 
the Congress. The Representative of Women's Football shall be a woman. The mandate shall 
be for a period of four years, beginning after the end of the Congress at which the 
Representative of Women's Football was elected."). 
179. Id. 
180. Alexandra Wrage, a former member of the IGC has described FIFA as "an outdated 
men's club." Alexandra Wrage, FIFA 's Rotten Reform Record, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2013, 10:11 
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was a remarkably small step for the second decade of the twenty-first 
century, it did represent actual, if long overdue, progress for FJF A, the 
all-male organizer of global football. Indeed, for FJF A and its then 
seventy-five-year old President Blatter, this was quite a remarkable 
step forward. 181 
Blatter dealt with these IGC and Task Force recommendations by 
requiring each of the FJF A continental confederations to consider 
them. The European confederation, UEF A, issued a press release in 
January 2013, following a meeting of all of its fifty-three national 
football association members. UEF A announced that its Members by 
"unanimous declaration" explicitly, and none too subtly, rejected 
several of the reform proposals. 182 Two of the more important 
proposals UEF A rejected were: a requirement that Executive 
Committee Members elected by the Confederations be subjected to 
"integrity checks" by FIFA and then confirmation by the entire FJF A 
Congress; and term limits for Executive Committee members. 183 As the 
most profitable and powerful Confederation within the FJF A empire, 184 
UEFA's rejection of recommendations designed to bring the bare 
beginnings of accountability to FJF A presented a serious obstacle to 
meaningful reform. 
The IGC published its Second Report in April 2013 after its first 
full year of operations. 185 It noted that over the prior year FJF A had 
taken "the first essential steps" toward reform by revamping the Ethics 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ alexandrawrage/2013/04/23/fifas-reform-
record/#3d I 8b07t7 545. 
181. Adding one woman to an Executive Committee of twenty-four men, can perhaps be 
best understood in the context of an earlier comment Sepp Blatter had made in 2004. 
Describing how women's football could be made more appealing to the public and thus attract 
larger crowds, Blatter is reported to have said: "They could, for example, have tighter shorts ... 
Let the women play in more feminine clothes like they do in volleyball." FIFA Lawyers: 
Blatter, Va/eke and Kattner Paid Themselves $80M, CNN (June 3, 2016, 5:38 PM), 
http ://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/03/footbal l/fifa-sepp-blatter-bonuses/. 
182. UEFA's announcement specifically stated: "The 53 European FIFA Member 
Associations give a mandate to the UEFA President, the European members of the FIFA 
Executive Committee and the UEFA General Secretary to present this declaration to FIFA as 
the clear position of the fifty-three European FIFA Member Associations." European 
Associations Issue Unanimous Declaration, EAFA (Jan. 24, 20I3, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.uefa.org/mediaservices/mediareleases/newsid= 191370 I .html; FIFA Lawyers: 
Blatter, Va/eke and Kattner Paid Themselves $80M, CNN (June 3, 2016, 5:38 PM), 
http ://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/03/footbal l/fifa-sepp-b latter-bonuses/. 
183. European Associations Issue Unanimous Declaration, supra note 182. 
184. Mike Ozanian, The World's Most Valuable Soccer Teams 2016, FORBES (May 11, 
2016, 9: 14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2016/05/l l/the-worlds-most-
valuable-soccer-teams-20 I 6/#6c2 I e45b2d04 
185. INDEP. GOVERNANCE COMM., SECOND REPORT BY THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNANCE 
COMMITTEE TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF FIFA (2013). 
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Committee and creating a "credible" Audit & Compliance 
Committee.186 The JGC emphasized in its first paragraph that FIFA 
needed fundamental reform and that "[t]he JGC expects the members 
of the Executive Committee to personally and actively support the 
project in their respective spheres."187 The JGC felt compelled to 
include this not-so-subtle exhortation because of the resistance to 
change it had encountered within FIFA. A Final Report by the JGC to 
the Executive Committee of FIFA was published on April 22, 2014. 188 
In politically correct, polite language, the JGC Final Report restated its 
reason for being, its activities and recommendations. 189 The Final 
Report emphasized the resistance to governance reform revealed by 
the UEFA "declaration." For example, the Final Report stated: 
However, the JGC was surprised and actually worried 
about the seriousness of some of the key opinion 
leaders in football, when a declaration of the 
Presidents and Secretaries General of all fifty-three 
Member Associations of UEF A was published on 
January 24, 2013, which fell short of fundamental 
requirements of modem governance in essential 
parts.190 
It is even more significant for the prospects for reforming FIFA 
that the Secretary General ofUEFA at the time of this declaration and 
the man who presided over the UEF A meeting that adopted this 
resolution was Gianni Infantino, the current President of FIFA. 191 
Discussing UEFA's opposition to the proposed "integrity checks" 
by FIFA, the JGC referred to actions taken that "substantially diluted" 
the JGC proposal, thus resulting in a "suboptimal outcome."192 
Additionally, the JGC noted that there were no truly independent 
members of the FIFA Executive Committee and that a fundamental 
tenet of modem corporate governance, transparency of senior officials' 
186. Id. at 3. 
187. Id. 
188. INDEP. GOVERNANCE COMM., FINAL REPORT BY THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNANCE 
COMMITTEE TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF FIFA (2014), 
https://www.baselgovemance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/documents/final_report_by_ 
igc_to_fifa_exco_en.pdf; Press Release, Basel Institute on Governance, !GC Issues Final 
Report (Apr. 23, 2014), 
https://www.baselgovemance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/documents/igc_issues_final 
_report.pdf. 
189. INDEP. GOVERNANCE COMM., SECOND REPORT, supra note 185. 
190. ld. at 10. 
191. European Associations Issue Unanimous Declaration, supra note 182. 
192. lNDEP. GOVERNANCE COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra note 188, at I 0. 
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remuneration, had not been achieved. 193 
The IGC Final Report does declare that "FIFA has successfully 
started its reform process."194 The IGC pointed with pride to the fact 
that the Ethics Committee's Investigatory Chamber head was 
investigating the allegations of corruption made with respect to the 
selection of Russia and Qatar as hosts for the 2018 and 2022 World 
Cups. 195 The IGC urged FIFA to use this investigation to determine 
the truth of these allegations, stating: "The Ethics Committee should 
not rest until there is a conclusive answer." 196 Further, the Ethics 
Committee investigation of these allegations is "the opportunity for 
FIFA to demonstrate that they have learned the lessons of the past and 
are determined to see a transparent and open organization setting an 
example of the highest ethical standards in the interests of the game 
and of the wider public interest." 197 One final conclusion of the IGC 
stated: 
In order to promote genuine cultural change, the IGC 
believes that some outside independent body should 
continue to work with FIFA to ensure that the road to 
reform is completely finished. This outside body can be 
smallbutmustbeadequatelyresourced to do the work. 198 
Blatter declared his "Roadmap to Reform" successful in June 
2013, stating: "We have weathered the storm."199 The Ethics 
Committee had been split into two chambers and truly independent 
leaders were appointed to head both the Investigative and the 
Adjudicative Chambers. 200 And, just as important, an authentically 
independent Domenico Scala had been hired as the Chair of the Audit 
and Compliance Committee. 201 While these actions "looked good" and 
were potentially promising, as we shall see, these moves were merely 
193. Id. 
194. Id., at 13. 
195. Id. at 13-15. 
196. Id. at 14. 
197. Id. 
198. lNDEP. GOVERNANCE COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra note 188, at 15. 
199. Joshua Robinson, FIFA Slowly Sails Toward Reform, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2013, 8:01 
AM), http://www. wsj .com/articles/SB I 0001424127887324063304578521301415971928. 
200. Independent Ethics Committee, supra note 161. 
201. New Audit and Compliance Committee Holds First Meeting, FIFA (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http ://www.fifa.com/ about-fifa/news/y=20 l 2/m=8/news=new-audit-and-comp Iiance-
committee-ho lds-first-meeting-1678423. html. But see, infra note 290 (recounting when Scala 
resigned in disgust as the result of actions taken by the new FIFA President in May 2016). 
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part of a charade and have led nowhere. 202 
In commenting on the work of the IGC, Guido Tognoni, a former 
FIFA Secretary General, told a Swiss television station that, "Mark 
Pieth has good intentions but to me he's like Sepp Blatter's poodle. He 
must bark loud but he's not allowed to bite. He had a promising 
approach but, of course, he's banging his head against a block of 
granite. "203 
C. The Garcia Report 
As noted, FIFA's restructuring of the Ethics Committee into two 
"chambers" at the recommendation of the IGC required that two 
authentically "independent" experts be identified to lead them. 
Michael J. Garcia, a former United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, was hired as Chairman of the Investigative 
Chamber.204 Dr. Hans-Joachim Eckert, a German judge, was hired as 
Chairman of the Adjudicatory Chamber.205 As had been emphasized 
in the Final Report of the IGC, Garcia and the Investigatory Chamber 
conducted an investigation into the bidding process that in 2010 had 
resulted in the selection of Russia and Qatar and to determine whether 
the selection of Russia and Qatar as World Cup host nations had been 
compromised in some way. 206 
Following an eighteen-month investigation, pursuant to the 
procedures established by FIFA, Garcia submitted the Investigatory 
Chamber's confidential, 450-page Report of Findings to Eckert's 
Adjudicatory Chamber. Eckert did not release the Garcia Report. In 
its place he prepared a forty-two page summary.207 The summary 
202. See Owen Gibson, Anti-bribery Expert Resigns in Frusttration at Lack of Fifa 
Progress, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/footbal 1/2013/apr/22/anti-bribery-resigns-fifa. 
203. Simon Bradley, 'A Culture of Change ls Seeping into FIFA,' SwrsSINFO (May 31, 
2013, 8:55 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/culture/football-reforms_-a-culture-of-change-
i s-seeping-into-fifa-/36006902. 
204. Fifa Appoints Michael J Garcia to Investigate Football Corruption, GUARDIAN (July 
17, 2012, 13:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/jul/17/fifa-michael-j-
garcia-football-corruption. 
205. Chairmen of Ethics Committee Announced and new Code of Ethics Approved, FIFA 
(July 17, 2012), http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2012/m=7 /news=chairmen-ethics-
committee-announced-and-new-code-ethics-approved-1664989 .html. 
206. Statement of the Chairman of the Adjudicatory Chamber for the F!F A Ethics 
Committee on the Report on the Inquiry into the 201812022 FIFA World Cup Bidding Process 
(Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/ document/affederation/footballgovemance/02/47/4117 5/statementc 
hairmanadjcheckert_neutral.pdf [hereinafter Eckert Statement]. 
207. Id. 
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stated that the Garcia investigation, together with a prior Ethics 
Committee investigation, "established a prima facie case that serious 
violations of bidding rules and the FIFA Code of Ethics have 
occurred."208 Prominently, the Eckert summary described an incident 
where a Qatari businessman, who was also a FIFA official, had 
distributed envelopes containing $40,000 in cash to voting members of 
the FIFA Executive Committee.209 
Notwithstanding this "prima facie" case and the stark details of 
the Qatari envelopes of cash, Eckert announced that the Ethics 
Committee had concluded that the selection of Russia and Qatar for 
the 2018 and 2022 World Cups was not the result of bribery and 
corruption.210 Eckert's explanation for this surprising conclusion 
stated: "To assume ... that envelopes full of cash are given in exchange 
for votes on a World Cup host is nai"ve."211 Garcia reacted by 
describing Eckert's conclusions as "materially incomplete and 
erroneous representations of facts and conclusions." Garcia demanded 
the publication of his entire report. When FIFA refused, Garcia 
resigned in disgust. 212 Garcia's comments at the time are revealing: 
The [FIFA] investigation and adjudication process 
operates in most parts unseen and unheard. That's a 
kind of system which might be appropriate for an 
intelligence agency but not for an ethics compliance 
process in an international sports institution that serves 
the public and is the subject of intense public scrutiny . 
. . Transparency is not intended to embarrass certain 
208. Id. at 23-24. 
209. FIFA bribery scandal: The $40, 000 'bung' at the heart of footba/l 's corruption storm, 
DAILY RECORD (May 31, 2013 6:37 AM), http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-
news/fifa-bribery-scandal-the-40000-bung-l I 04320. 
210. Eckert Statement, supra note 206, at 7-8. 
211. Id. at 41. Michael Garcia is hardly naive. Now a judge on New York State's highest 
court Garcia is the former federal prosecutor who brought down New York's sitting governor, 
Elliot Spitzer, and prosecuted the 1993 World Trade Center bombers as well as those involved 
in the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Honorable Michael J. Garcia, 
CT. APPEALS ST. N.Y., https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/jgarcia.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 
2016). 
212. Six months after Garcia resigned as Chair of the Investigative Chamber of the FIFA 
Ethics Committee, on May 27, 2015, the initial Department of Justice Indictment was released 
to the public. Two days later Sepp Blatter was reelected to his fifth four-year term as FIFA 
President. On June 2, 2015 Blatter announced that, while he was not guilty of any wrongdoing, 
he would resign as FIFA President once the Extraordinary Congress of FIFA members elected 
a new President. Jere Longman, FIFA Investigator Michael J. Garcia Quits in Dispute over 
Report, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/sports/soccer/michael-j-garcia-resigns-as-fifa-
prosecutor-in-protest.html. 
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individuals by airing dirty laundry or to harm the 
organization by showing what went wrong, it's the 
opposite. Where the institution has taken significant 
steps forward and made that progress transparency 
provides evidence of that to the public.213 
London's Independent newspaper commented on Eckert's 
unlikely conclusion, stating: "FIFA has descended yet further into 
farce."214 The governance charade or farce repeatedly perpetrated by 
FIFA has been described as the difference between "good governance" 
and "good-looking governance."215 
D. How Eager is FIFA to Reform? 
Professor Roger Piekle, Jr. has analyzed the TI' s Safe Hands 
Report, the separate Mark Pieth report and the IGC Reports, each of 
which were genuine efforts to introduce honest, effective corporate 
governance to FIFA. Pielke notes that of a total of fifty-nine 
recommendations for reform in these studies, FIFA adopted a grand 
total of seven, with ten more partially adopted. 216 The remaining forty-
two were completely ignored.217 As one of its independent members 
declared shortly after resigning from the IGC: "Opportunities for 
change have been evaded, finessed or re-directed .... "218 
1. The Carrard Committee 
Immediately following the May 2015 Department of Justice 
indictment and shortly after he had stated he would resign, Blatter met 
with Domenico Scala, the independent Chair of the Audit & Finance 
Committee, to consider how to introduce further "reforms." On the 
meeting, Blatter commented: "I had a good, constructive meeting with 
Mr. Scala to establish a framework for action f sic l and a timetable. I 
am pleased to take advice and guidance from Mr. Scala, I want a 
comprehensive programme of reform and I am very aware that only 
213. Chief Ethics Investigator Michael Garcia Criticizes FIFA 's Culture of Secrecy, Fox 
SPORTS (Oct. 13, 2014, 11:24 AM), http://www.foxsports.com/soccer/story/chief-ethics-
investigator-michael-garcia-criticizes-fifa-s-culture-of-secrecy-l 01314. 
214. Tom Peck, Eckert: FIFA Summary Was Word/or Word, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 14, 
2015), http://www. independent. co. uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/eckert-fi fa-
summary-was-word-for-word-9862663 .html. 
215. Andrews & Harrington, supra note 17, at 194. 
216. Roger Pielke, Jr., A Deeper Look at FIFA 's Reform Scorecard, PLAY GAME (Oct. 15, 
2013), http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2013/a-deeper-look-at-
fifa%E2%80%99s-reform-scorecard/. 
217. Id. 
218. Wrage, supra note 180. 
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the FIFA Congress can pass these reforms."219 
Following an Executive Committee meeting held in June 2015 
Blatter proudly announced yet another reform effort, this one he 
labeled the "Task Force - Reforms."220 FIFA announ~ed that this effort 
was to be led by "an independent person outside the world of 
football."221 This new effort, however, would also be "overseen by the 
independent bodies of FIFA, namely the Audit & Compliance, the 
Disciplinary and the Ethics Committees. "222 In August 2015 FIFA 
announced that the independent chair of this latest of FIFA' s unending 
string of highly publicized, impotent reform efforts, was to be seventy-
seven year old Dr. Francois Carrard, a Swiss lawyer who had 
previously served as Director General of the International Olympic 
Committee from 1989 to 2003.223 
Carrard renamed the committee the "2016 FIFA Reform 
Committee" which concluded its work in the fall of 2015 and presented 
its report to the December 2015 meeting of the FIFA Executive 
Committee.224 Dr. Carrard's presentation to the Executive Committee 
was typically FIFA-slick, containing all the right buzzwords of 
accepted international corporate governance: "Responsibility; 
Humility; Tone at the Top; Respect; and Candour."225 Carrard noted 
that his Committee had heard from Domenico Scala, Chair of the Audit 
& Compliance Committee; had considered the reports of the IGC, TI 
and an outside group supported by the Danish government, Play the 
Game;226 and had "engaged with the commercial partners ofFIFA."227 
Despite claiming to have "engaged with the commercial partners," on 
219. President Blatter: Reform Work Has Already Started, FIFA.COM (Jun 4, 2015), 
http://www. ti fa.com/ govemance/news/y=20 l 5/m=6/news=president-b latter-reform-work-
has-already-started-2618966 .html. 
220. Task Force "Reforms" to Be Chaired by Independent Person from Outside Football, 
FIFA.COM (July 27, 2015), http://www.fifa.com/govemance/news/y=2015/m=7/news=task-
force-reforms-to-be-chaired-by-independent-person-from-outside-fo-26681 7 8 .html. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Biography Chairman 2016 FIFA Reform Committee Fran9ois Carrard, 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/committees/02/67 /03/48/12.8.15 .biodrc 
arrard_ok_neutral.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2016); Simon Evans, FIFA Reform Chief Carrard 
Says Criticism of Blatter 'Unfair,' REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2015, 2:32 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-soccer-fifa-blatter-carrard-id USKCNOQSOTN20150823. 
224. Executive Committee Meeting, FIFA (Dec. 2, 2015); 
http://resources.tifa.com/mm/ document/affederation/footballgovemance/0217 4/ I 7 /96/ exco_r 
eformcommitteefinal_neutral.pdf 
225. Id. 
226. PLAY GAME, http://www.playthegame.org/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2016). 
227. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMM., 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT (2015). 
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December 1, 2015, one day prior to Carrard' s presentation to the FIFA 
Executive Committee, five major FIFA sponsors228 published an open 
letter to the FIFA Executive Committee timidly noting: 
We want to emphasize to you the values and 
characteristics that we believe should be incorporated 
through the reforms. Transparency, accountability, 
respect for human rights, integrity, leadership and 
gender equality are crucial to the future of FIFA. 
Reforms can set the proper framework for these 
characteristics, but a cultural change is also needed. 229 
This letter commands the inference that while the initial publicly 
declared intent was to include sponsors on the Reform Committee,230 
these major sponsors did not believe they had been heard. As 
originally announced in August, the Carrard reform committee was to 
include two "representatives appointed by FIFA Commercial 
partners."231 Where were these representatives? They never became 
members of this committee. Carrard's statement that his Committee 
had "engaged with" the sponsors was apparently not the same for these 
sponsors as actually being afforded the opportunity to actually 
contribute to the Committee's work. 
The Carrard Report was comprehensive. It "looked good." It 
addressed financial transparency, related party transactions, and how 
grants to member associations should be determined and 
administered. 232 The Report restated the prior IGC proposal for term 
limits for the President and Executive Committee Members so recently 
opposed by UEF A, and again proposed transparency of the 
compensation FIFA paid to senior FIFA personnel and Executive 
Committee members.233 The Carrard Report also recommended that 
each Continental Confederation be required to elect at least one woman 
228. AB InBev (Budweiser), Adidas, the Coca-Cola Company, McDonald's and Visa 
signed this letter. Other major sponsors, Russia's GazProm and South Korea's Hyundai were 
not associated with this open letter. 
229. Coca-Cola Co., Open Letter to the FJF A Executive Committee, COCA-COLA JOURNEY 
(Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/open-letter-to-the-fifa-executive-
committee/. 
230. Members 2016 FIFA Reform Committee, 
http ://resources.fifa.com/mm/ document/affederation/ committees/02/67 /03/61 /ultimatememb 
ersfifa20 I 6reformcommittee_neutral.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2016). 
231. Id. 
232. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMM., supra note 227. 
233. While calling for transparency at FIFA and conceding that he was to be paid for his 
work as Chair, Carrard declined to disclose the amount of his own compensation. Evans, supra 
note 223. 
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representative and suggested that the Executive Committee, which was 
to be renamed the Executive Council, be expanded from twenty-five 
to thirty-seven members to add these six women as well as some other 
recommended changes. 234 
The Extraordinary Congress called to elect a new FIFA President 
took place on February 26, 2016.235 Blatter did not preside at this 
Congress, however, because on October 8, 2015,236 he had been 
suspended as President by the Ethics Committee pending a criminal 
investigation of a $2 million payment made by Blatter to Michel 
Platini, former Secretary General of FIFA. 237 FIFA' s Acting President 
at the time of the Extraordinary Congress was Issa Hayatou, the longest 
serving FIFA Vice President. 238 Having seen the Carrard presentation 
on December 2, 2015 and having endured another raid by Swiss 
authorities on behalf of the Department of Justice on December 3, 
2015, this time the FIFA Executive Committee endorsed all of the 
Carrard' s recommendations. 
The full FIFA Congress met in February 2016 and adopted the 
Executive Committee recommendations thus insuring the adoption of 
some of the recommendations the IGC and others had unsuccessfully 
put forward earlier. For example, "integrity checks" of Executive 
Committee/Executive Council officials, which had been opposed in 
UEFA's January 2013 declaration, were added to the FIFA Statutes.239 
Term limits for FIFA Council members, also opposed in the DEF A 
Declaration, are now included, although these are solely prospective 
and will not count the many years some members of the Executive 
Council have already enjoyed in FIFA' s culture of corruption. 240 The 
individual compensation, or at least some portion of it, of the President 
234. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMM., supra note 227. 
235. Krishnadev Calamur, FIFA, Ho-Hum?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2016/02/fifa-elects-president/4 70964/. 
236. Independent Ethics Committee Bans Several Football Officials, FIFA.COM (Oct. 8, 
2015), http://www.fifa.com/govemance/news/y=2015/m= I O/news=independent-ethics-
committee-bans-several-football-officials-2709916.html. 
237. Blatter and Platini had been suspended by the FIFA Ethics Committee once the Swiss 
Attorney General commenced its investigation. Rob Bagchi, Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini 
Banned for Eight Years by Fifa, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 21, 2015, 3:42 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co. uk/sport/football/fifa/12061288/Sepp-B latter-and-Michel-Platini-
banned-for-eight-years-by-F i fa-Jive.html; Independent Ethics Committee Bans Several 
Football Officials, supra note 236. 
238. Hayatou served as Acting President pursuant to Article 33. 7 of the FIFA Statutes. 
FIFA, supra note 8, art. 33.7. 
239. Id. art. 40.40. 
240. Id. art. 33. 
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and Council members is now required to be made public. 241 
E. Perfect Impunity 
[Vol. 32:68 
In the eleven decades since its founding in 1904, FIFA has 
evolved into a tremendously broad enterprise. It now administers not 
only traditional men's football but also women's football, futsal242 and 
beach volleyball243 and, according to a recent FIFA document 
describing its vision of the future, FIFA has plans to expand into 
eSports as well. 244 
FIFA' s staff of more than 200 is headquartered in a $200 million 
building which administers FIFA's global empire with more members 
than the United Nations.245 As FIFA developed into a billion-dollar 
multinational enterprise, its leadership and corporate governance 
mechanisms have not sufficiently changed. The institutional reforms 
required to properly monitor and control FIFA' s billions were not 
implemented, and the required financial expertise was never added to 
FIF A's Executive Committee. Since there is no higher authority to 
which FIFA answers, FIF A's leaders have been able to take advantage 
of the many temptations which billions of dollars presents. As Justice 
Robert Jackson wrote in a comparable situation this "opportunity for 
abuse ... was not neglected. "246 
As the Department of Justice Indictment notes, it was the 
tremendous expansion and commercial success of FIFA and football 
that "enabled [FIFA] to generate unprecedented profits through the sale 
of media rights to soccer matches. The corruption of the enterprise arose 
and flourished in this context."247 For example, bribing to get votes for 
President248 by buying support of Member entities through "sweetheart 
deals" of unrestricted, unaudited football development grants249 has 
241. Id. art. 51, ii I 0. 
242. An indoor version of football played with five players, including the goalkeeper. 
243. See FIFA, FIFA 2.0: THE VISION FOR THE FUTURE (2016). 
244. Id. at 43. 
245. Charlotte Alfred, If FIFA Was A Country, This ls What It Would Look Like, 
HuFFPOST: THE WORLDPOST (July 3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/03/fifa-
controversy_n_5537578.html. 
246. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). 
247. Superseding Indictment, supra note 19, at 39-40. 
248. Martyn Ziegler, Former Fifa President Hopeful Alleges Vote-buying, INDEPENDENT 
(Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/former-fifa-
president-hopeful-al leges-vote-buying-6288010 .html. 
249. Current President Gianni Infantino's campaign promises included millions for 
national football associations and for the continental confederations. David Conn, Gianni 
Infantino 's Victory Offers Fifa a Glimmer of Hope Amid the Gloom, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2016, 
3 :00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2016/feb/26/giann i-infantino-fifa-
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resulted in the modem FIFA, a corruption travesty, where the moral 
hazard of knowing "no one is watching" has led to unending scandals 
which go unpunished.250 Indeed the term "FIFA reform" is best 
understood as an oxymoron. Without accountability reforms are not 
sufficient to insure honest, effective management of this huge 
enterprise. Absent accountability, FIF A's leaders will continue to 
operate FIFA for their own benefit, making friends and associates rich 
in return for undisclosed benefits and all without fear of any 
consequences. 
IV. FIFA: UNTOUCHABLE BECAUSE IT Is NOT ACCOUNTABLE 
Prospects are grim for a reformed FIFA, an institution that will 
faithfully live up to the lofty objectives set out in the FIFA Statutes. 
One of these objectives is a fine worthy one, that recites all the right 
words, but is currently completely absent from FIFA operations: "[T]o 
promote integrity, ethics and fair play with a view to preventing all 
methods or practices, such as corruption, doping or match 
manipulation, which might jeopardise the integrity of matches, 
competitions, players, officials and member associations or give rise 
to abuse of association football."251 
A. Why Change a Culture When, after all, "Things are really good 
- just the way they are. " 
As documented in books and an unending torrent of news items, 
and as duly reported in the IGC,252 Carrard,253 and other reports,254 a 
culture of corruption has pervaded the entire football ecosystem for 
president-sheik-salman-sepp-blatter. 
250. Jack Warner, Joao Havelange, and Ricardo Teixeira are just three of the many who 
have escaped FIFA's "punishment" by resigning. 
251. FIFA, supra note 8, art. 2(g). 
252. INDEP. GOVERNANCE COMM., supra note 185. 
253. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMM., supra note 227. 
254. In response to criticism of human rights conditions for workers working on World 
Cup projects in Qatar, FIFA asked Harvard's John Ruggie, the former United Nations Special 
Representative for Business and Human Rights, to recommend changes at FIFA which would 
"embed respect for human rights across its global operations." Professor Ruggie delivered his 
Report, "FIFA & Human Rights," in April 2016, recommending that clear policies be 
"embedded" in all aspects ofFIFA's operations and that FIFA conduct a complete analysis of 
human rights risks and adopt enabling remedies as appropriate. A human rights provision was 
added to FIFA Statutes in 2016. JOHN G. RUGG!E, "FOR THE GAME. FOR THE WORLD." FIFA 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2016). While at the United Nations Ruggie had prepared the United 
Nation's Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights officially endorsed by the U.N. 
in June 2011. See U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE HIGH CoMM'R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011 ). 
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decades. Further, describing FIFA over the twenty-four years from 
1991 to 2015, the Department of Justice Indictment refers to FIFA's 
"World Cup ofFraud."255 
1. What is a "culture of corruption?" 
Should we realistically expect FIFA to reform its accepted 
"equilibrium" of corruption?256 After all, humanity has often noted, yet 
failed to eliminate corrupt behaviors over the ages.257 The Ten 
Commandants have forbidden adultery for five millennia or more, but 
not with notable success. Twenty-five centuries ago, the problem of 
corruption in government was explained in terms that remain apt today: 
Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the 
poison) that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so 
it is impossible for a government servant not to eat 
up, at least, a bit of the king's revenue. Just as fish 
moving under water cannot possibly be found out 
either as drinking or not drinking water, so 
government servants employed in the government 
work cannot be found out (while) taking money for 
themselves. 258 
Effecting fundamental changes in FIF A's accepted equilibrium of 
non-transparency, dishonesty and self-enrichment will be, at the very 
255. Rupert Neate, Fifa Officials Pocketed $150m from 'World Cup of Fraud' - US 
Prosecutors, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015, 2:05 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/may/2 7 /fifa-officials-world-cup-fraud-us-
prosecutors. 
256. Others describe governments where corruption is rife as operating in an 
"equilibrium" of corruption. See e.g., Amanda Taub, How 'Islands of Honesty' Can Cursh a 
System of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/world/asia/south-korea-brazi 1-argentina-
impeachment.html. 
257. For example, seventy years ago smoking was widely accepted throughout the United 
States and much of the rest of the world. Cigarettes were seen on the streets, in our offices and 
homes, in movies, on television and sneaked in school bathrooms. Smoking saturated print 
advertising. Smoking was part of American culture. Serious efforts to curtail smoking in the 
United States began in January 1964 with the U.S. Surgeon General's Report. Half a century 
later there has been progress. Over these fifty years smoking rates as a percentage of the adult 
population have been significantly reduced from 43% to 18%. Other aspects of earlier cultures 
which have slowly changed over similarly extended periods include the abolition of slavery and 
the granting of women's suffrage. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORTS ON SMOKING AND TOBACCO 
USE, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2017}; 
OFFICE OF SURGEON GEN., THE HEAL TH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING-50 YEARS OF PROGRESS 
(2014 ), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/1 ibrary/reports/50-years-of-progress/ful I-report. pdf. 
258. Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1320, 1320 (1997) (citing KAUTJLIYA, ARTHASASTRA (R.P. Kangle trans. 
1979)(4th Cent. B.C.)). 
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least, a daunting task. Is it even conceivable that those who have thrived 
in FIFA's culture of corruption for so many decades could make the 
necessary basic changes in FIFA' s operations, even if they truly desired 
it? After all, platitudinous press releases and bombastic denials from 
FIFA' s Corruption Crisis Playbook have served FIFA well for decades. 
As one former independent expert brought to FIFA as part of the IGC 
has said: 
Does the leadership have any incentive to reform itself? Clearly 
not. It really is time to recognize that anyone with sufficient insider 
status to run for and win an election at FIFA has been there long 
enough to understand that things are really very good - just the way 
they are.259 
2. Within Football's culture of corruption no meaningful reform 
should be expected260 
Currently there is no authority to which FIFA is responsible. 
There is no analog of a public company's shareholders who, when 
sufficiently outraged or motivated, can seek justice from a legal 
system. Indeed, FIFA's leaders have thrived in Switzerland's sports 
criminal nirvana, where, whatever FIFA officials do, whatever they 
steal, no matter what bribes they receive, they are answerable to 
absolutely no one. When allegations of fraud, self-dealing, bribery or 
other forms of corruption do penetrate the long-standing FIFA cloak 
of non-transparency, guilty parties may simply resign from FIFA, thus 
avoiding the "punishment" FIFA may exact under its Ethics Code. 261 
And there can be no confidence in the current Ethics Committee, which 
found prima facie evidence of bribery insufficient to question the 
selection process in 2010. 
259. Alexandra Wrage, FIFA: More of the Same?, MARK NEWS (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.themarknews.com/2016/06/30/fi fa-more-of-the-same/. 
260. Though this article is focused on the main body of FIFA, it is important to note that 
there are many indications that FIFA's continental confederations and at least some of the 
national associations may be similarly thoroughly corrupt. For example, the Department of 
Justice indicted the three immediate past presidents of the Brazilian football association and 
three prior presidents of CONMEBOL. Additionally, Jack Warner, former President of 
CONCACAF and Vice President of FIFA; Jeffrey Webb, former President ofCONCACAF, 
Costas Takkas, former President of Cayman Islands football; and Chuck Blazer are four of 
those named as defendants in the Indictment. Nine F!F A Officials and Five Corporate 
Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, supra note 22. 
261. See FIFA, supra note 81; supra Section II.B.2. 
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3. Is FIFA a Super Sovereign? 
FIFA deems itself to be a supra-national institution.262 As noted, 
former President Havelange stated there were only three powers on 
earth: the United States, the Soviet Union and FIFA. 263 FIFA boasts of 
having more members than the United Nations and Blatter reveled in 
being addressed as "Excellency." More significant, FIFA has a 
practice of regularly imposing its will on sovereign nations. One 
recent example of this was FIFA requiring Brazil, as host of the 2014 
World Cup, to overturn a ten-year old Brazilian law banning the sale 
of alcohol in its football stadiums. Two years before the 2014 Brazil 
World Cup the Secretary General of FIFA declared: "Alcoholic drinks 
are part of the Fifa World Cup, so we 're going to have them. Excuse 
me ifl sound a bit arrogant but that's something we won't negotiate."264 
Budweiser was a prominent sponsor of FIFA during the 2014 World 
Cup. 
Other examples of FIFA's supranational role are found in 
Nigeria,265 Belize,266 South Africa267 and in the recent effort by FIFA to 
prohibit Scottish and English players from wearing poppies which 
commemorate the millions who died in World War I. 268 
Additionally, in November 2016 FIFA's Secretary General, 
Fatma Samoura, announced a visit to Sierra Leone, where the 
government's Anti-Corruption Commission is investigating match-
fixing and the mismanagement of funds given to the Sierra Leone 
262. Wrage, supra note 180. 
263. See Ziegler, supra note 68; supra Section III.B. 
264. Beer 'Must Be Sold' at Brazil World Cup, Says Fifa, BBC (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-16624823. 
265. Brian Oliver, Free-for-all and corruption in African football shames Fifa, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 24, 2010, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/201 O/oct/24/conuption-
african-football-fifa. 
266. Suspension of the Football Federation of Belize, FIFA.COM (June 17, 2011) 
http://www. fi fa.com/worldcup/news/y=2011 /m=6/news=suspension-the-football-federation-
bel ize-1454212.html. 
267. South Africa agreed to create "World Cup Courts" to speed justice in connection with 
violations of World Cup related offenses, such as petty larceny, or selling non-FIFA sponsor 
products within a World Cup "designated area. See, e.g., 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa 
Special Measures Act of2006 (S. Afr.); 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures 
Safety and Security Regulations, 2009, GN R. 680 ofGG 32326 (12 June 2009). 
268. The poppy armbands were worn on November 11, 2016, Remembrance Day in 
Britain, the date on which the World War I Armistice was signed. FIFA announced that it had 
imposed fines totaling more than $100,000 on the national football associations of England, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Ireland for ignoring FIFA's edict. Fifa 'Rejects England & 
Scotland Request to Wear Poppies on Armbands', BBC (Nov. 1, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/37832115. 
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Football Association ("SLFA").269 She asked the SLFA to arrange a 
meeting with Sierra Leone's President, saying: "We are confident that 
Sierra Leone's president and government officials will understand and 
honour our request for an official visit on November 16. "21° FIFA 
declared from afar that: 
FIFA has no reason to suspect there has been misuse of 
funds that FIFA has provided to the SLFA ... In 
addition, over the course of the last three years, FIFA 
has noticed several activities of third parties that could 
be considered as interference (in) the running of the 
SLF A.... Fifa urges the relevant Sierra Leone 
authorities - in particular the Ministry of Sports and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission - to allow the SLFA to 
conduct its affairs and activities without unnecessary 
obstruction as no Fifa regulations have been 
contravened with regards to the Fifa funding. 271 
It is clear after more than a century of scandals and a broad array 
of good-looking reforms carefully packaged in nice-sounding press 
releases that FIFA regularly imposes its will on sovereign nations, and 
absent accountability, should be expected to continue this practice. 
B. The First 100+ Days of Infantino 
The former Secretary General and Acting President of UEF A, 
Gianni Infantino, was elected President of FIFA at the February 26, 
2016 Extraordinary Meeting of the FIFA Congress necessitated by 
Blatter's announcement272 that he would resign upon election of a 
successor at an Extraordinary Congress of FIFA. 273 Of the initial slate 
of seven candidates who sought to succeed Blatter, Infantino was 
elected in the second round of voting when Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein 
of Jordan threw his support to Infantino, defeating Sheikh Salman Bin 
Ebrahim Al Khalifa of Bahrain and insuring Infantino's election.274 
269. Fifa's Fatma Samoura to Visit Sierra Leone over FA Dispute, BBC (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/37900368. 
270. Id. 
271. Fifa Backs Sierra Leone FA in Use of Funds, BBC (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/3 7432190. 
272. FIFA President to Lay Down His Mandate at Extraordinary Elective Congress, 
FIFA.COM (June 2, 2015), http://www.fifa.com/govemance/news/y=2015/m=6/news=fifa-
president-to-lay-down-hi s-mandate-at-extraordinary-electi ve-congr-2617742. html. 
273. As noted, Issa Hayatou was serving as Interim President of FIFA at this time. See 
Evans, supra note 223. 
274. Ben Rurnsby, Gianni Infantino 's First Crisis as Fifa President Intensifies as Prince 
Ali Accuses Him of 'Complete Betrayal,' TELEGRAPH (May 15, 2016, 2:24 PM), 
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Was lnfantino's election good news for football? 
As a basic tenet of his campaign for the FIFA presidency, 
Infantino essentially bribed voting members. 275 Specifically, "Mr. 
Infantino was the candidate for the presidency that stood at the podium, 
on live television, and promised each of the 209 football associations 
$5 million. Even in his heyday, Blatter restrained himself to million 
dollar handouts. Infantino's billion dollar promise out-Blattered 
Blatter. ... "276 
While a new FIFA president was essential to reforming FIFA, 
electing Infantino from within the corrupt football ecosystem277 was 
not the fresh start FIFA needed. 278 
1. Infantino' s New Secretary General 
Infantino pleasantly surprised much of the football world at his 
first regular FIFA Congress held in Mexico City. On May 13, 2016 he 
secured the election279 of Fatma Samoura, an experienced United 
Nations official from Senegal as the first woman Secretary General of 
FIF A.280 A truly independent Secretary General from outside the FIFA 
world is welcome news and augured well for the future of corporate 
governance at FIFA since the Secretary General is the Chief Executive 
Officer of FIFA. 281 Furthermore, appointing a woman and one from 
outside FIFA's contaminated culture of corruption momentarily 
enhanced FIFA's abysmal record as an all-male institution, and was a 
sign that things could change at FIFA. 
http://www.telegraph.co. uk/footbal 1/2016/05/ 16/ gianni-infantinos-first-crisis-as-fifa-
president-intensifies-as/. 
275. Wrage, supra note 180. 
276. Id. 
277. Infantino had been working at UEFA for more than fifteen years when elected to the 
FIFA presidency. He has been described as a "career sports administrator." Conn, supra note 
256. 
278. Notably, Infantino was implicated in the "Panama Papers" for signing an agreement 
selling rights to certain tournaments in Latin America. Infantino was head of Legal Services 
at UEFA at the time. The Panama Papers, ICIJ, https://panamapapers.icij.org/ (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2016); FIFA head Gianni Infantino Implicated in Panama Papers, DW (June 4, 
2016), http://www.dw.com/en/ti fa-head-gianni-infantino-imp licated-in-panama-papers/a-
l 9165971. 
279. FIFA, supra note 8, art. 34.9 ("The Council shall appoint the Secretary General on 
the proposal of the President. The Secretary General may be dismissed by the Council acting 
alone."). 
280. Fatma Samba Diouf Samoura Appointed FIFA Secretary General, FIFA.COM (May 
13, 2016), http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=20 l 6/m=5/news=fatma-samba-diouf-
samoura-appointed-fifa-secretary-general-2790885.htrnl. 
281. FIFA, supra note 8, art. 37. I. 
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2. FIFA's Version of"Independence" 
The potential progress exemplified by Samoura's election was 
offset when Infantino, on the same day, arranged for the Congress to 
give the FIFA Executive Council, the newly expanded version of the 
earlier FIFA Executive Committee, the power to remove the 
"independent" members on the FIFA Ethics and Audit and 
Compliance, Appeal and Governance Committees who had only 
recently been installed in 2012.282 The head of the FIFA Audit and 
Compliance Committee, Domenico Scala, the leading independent 
member of FIFA's administration, angrily resigned,283 asserting that 
this "stealthy" change meant that the so-called "independent" FIFA 
committees "are factually deprived of their independence and are in 
danger of becoming auxiliary agents of those whom they should 
actually supervise."284 
3. Ethics Committee Investigates Infantino Regarding Leaked 
Memo 
Immediately following the FIFA Congress in Mexico City, an 
unknown FIFA employee forwarded an eleven page memo to the then 
acting head of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee. 285 This 
memo, dated May 23, 2016, which was subsequently leaked to the 
press,286 charged Infantino with a number of acts as newly elected 
President which the unknown employee believed should be considered 
by the Audit Committee and passed on to the Ethics Committee.287 The 
memo described potential breaches of several articles in the FIFA 
282. Owen Gibson, Fifa's Independent Audit Committee Chairman Resigns in Protest at 
Reforms, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/may/l 4/ domen ico-scala-fifa-auditor-resigns-
protest. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. An email leaked to German and Swiss media in June 2016 indicated that Infantino 
had ordered the destruction ofa recording of the Executive Council meeting he had conducted 
prior to the May 13, 2016 Mexico City FIFA Congress. News reports suggest the recordings 
revealed that Infantino had "pushed for the removal ofFIFA's Audit and Compliance Chief 
Domenico Scala. Andrew Warshaw, Infantino Orders Council Tapes Destroyed as FIFA 's 
New Culture of Cover-up Deepens, INSIDE WORLD FOOTBALL (June 3, 2016), 
http ://www.insideworldfootball.com/2016/06/03/infantino-orders-council-tapes-destroyed-
fi fas-new-culture-cover-deepens. 
285. Andy Brown, Leaked Memo Accuses Infantino of Ethics Committee Violations, 
SPORTS INTEGRITY INITIATIVE (July 5, 2016), http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/leaked-
memo-accuses-fifas-infantino-of-ethics-committee-violations/. 
286. Id. 
287. MEMORANDUM FROM REDACTED TO SINDISIWE MABASO-KOYANA, ACTING 
CHAIRPERSON OF THE AUDIT AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE (May 23, 2016). 
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Ethics Code. 
The matter was referred to the FIFA Ethics Committee which 
conducted an informal investigation into certain expenses and claims 
for expense reimbursement as well as Infantino' s improper use of 
private jets for travel to Moscow, Doha, and Slovenia.288 The memo 
asserted that taking private aircraft paid for by third parties created a 
conflict of interest in violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the FIFA Code 
of Ethics. 289 The preliminary investigation led to formal Ethics 
Committee proceedings and on August 5, 2016, a press release directly 
from the Investigatory Chamber of the Ethics Committee stated: "It 
was found that no violation of the FIFA Code of Ethics (FCE) had been 
committed by Mr Infantino. The adjudicatory chamber took note of 
and accepted the decision of the investigatory chamber."290 
The May 23, 2016 memo later generated news reports of yet 
another possibly related issue. A July 5, 2016 news item describes a 
"purge" of alleged whistleblowers."29 I Two FIFA staff members 
logically involved in preparing the leaked memo, Severin Podolak, 
head of FIFA's travel section and a long-time employee at FIFA, and 
Christoph Schmidt, chief of the Secretary General's office, were 
summarily terminated according to this unconfirmed item.292 
4. Blatter-Kattner- Valcke Bonuses 
Quinn Emanuel293 is the U.S.-based international law firm hired 
by FIFA in May 2015 immediately upon the release of the first 
Department of Justice Indictment. Even though not indicted, FIFA 
apparently hired the firm because it wanted to protect itself. 294 As part 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. Independent Ethics Committee Concludes Proceedings Regarding Gianni Infantino, 
FIFA.COM (Aug. 5, 2016). 
http://www. ti fa.com/ govemance/news/y=2016/m=8/news=independent-ethics-committee-
concludes-proceedings-regarding-gianni-in-2819869. html. 
291. Andrew Warshaw, More Blood on the Walls at FIFA as Top Bosses Purge Ethics 
Collaborators, INSIDE WORLD FOOTBALL (July 5, 2016), 
http://www. insideworldfootbal l.com/2016/07 /05/b lood-wal ls-tifa-top-bosses-purge-eth ics-
co llaborators/. 
292. Id. 
293. The formal name of the firm is Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP. QUINN 
EMANUEL TRIAL LAWYERS, http://www.quinnemanuel.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2016). 
294. Malcom Moore & Ralph Atkins, Fifa: The fall of the house of Blatter, FIN. TIMES 
(Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/64573fc6-8df6-11 e5-a549-b89aldfede9b; 
David Ingram, Nate Raymond & Katharina_Bart, FIFA hires ex-U.S. prosecutor as its lawyer 
in bribery probe, REUTERS (June 5, 2015, 6:09 PM),_http://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-
fifa-lawyer-idUSKBNOOL I YQ20150605. 
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of this effort, Quinn Emanuel began an investigation into past FIFA 
operations.295 On May 23, 2016, FIFA announced that Markus Kattner, 
FIFA Chief Financial Officer,296 had been fired. On June 3, 2016 Quinn 
Emanuel made public information regarding Kattner' s dismissal which 
also implicated Blatter and Jerome Valcke, the prior Secretary General 
banned by FIFA at the end of 2015. 297 The Quinn Emanuel 
investigation determined that between 2010 and 2015 Blatter, Valcke 
and Chief Financial Officer Kattner had entered into a series of 
contracts with FIFA, approved and executed among themselves, 
providing remarkably generous compensation bonuses in addition to 
their very generous and still secret salaries; the bonuses totaled more 
than $80,000,000.298 Quinn Emanuel has suggested that these 
arrangements were clear breaches of the fiduciary duties of these 
officers to FIFA as well as likely being in violation of Swiss law. 299 
5. KPMG Resigns 
In a highly unusual development in the staid world of Big Four 
public auditing companies, on June 13, 2016, just ten days after the 
295. Rebecca R. Ruiz, In FIFA Inquiry, Switzerland Aids U.S. but Is Wary of Being 
Eclipsed, N. Y. Tl MES (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/sports/soccer/in-
fifa-inquiry-switzerland-aids-us-but-is-wary-of-being-eclipsed.html. 
296. At the time Kattner was also Acting Secretary General replacing Jerome Valcke, long 
serving Secretary General who had been suspended on September 17, 2015 in connection with 
an investigation into a major scandal involving ticket sales for the 2014 World Cup held in 
Brazil. Following a review by the FIFA Ethics Committee Valcke had been terminated on 
January 9, 2016. Nick Harris & Charles Sale, FIFA Secretary General Jerome Va/eke Relieved 
of his Duties After Being Accused of Seeking to Earn Huge Profits by Providing World Cup 
Tickets for Sale on Black Market, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 18, 2015 4:50 PM), 
http://www.dailymaj I .co. uk/sport/sportsnews/article-3 23 8665/FIF A-hit-fresh-scandal-Sepp-
B latter-s-right-hand-man-Jerome-Valcke-accused-seeking-eam-huge-profits-providing-
W orld-Cup-tickets-sale-b lack-market.html. 
297. Attorneys for FIFA Provide Update on Internal Investigation and Details on 
Compensation for Former Top Officials, FJFA.COM (June 3, 2016), 
http://www. fi fa.com/ govemance/news/y=20 l 6/m=6/news=attomeys-for-fi fa-provide-
update-on-intemal-investigation-and-detail-2799851.html. 
298. Salary continuation schemes and complete indemnification for legal expenses and 
fines etc., even if dismissed for cause were also included. Zachary Zagger, Top FIFA Leaders 
Paid Themselves $80M, Quinn Emanuel Says, LAW 360 (June 3, 2016, 4:39 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/803395/top-fifa-leaders-paid-themselves-80m-quinn-
emanuel-says. 
299. The firm commented that it was "noteworthy" that the final extension of Kattner's 
employment contracts provided for a four-year extension of his guaranteed salary to 2023, 
thus giving him a total of more than eight years of guaranteed salary and bonus, was approved 
by the Compensation subcommittee of the Audit and Compliance Committee on May 30, 
2015. This was just three days after Swiss authorities had raided the Baur au Lac hotel and 
arrested seven FIFA officials for alleged fraud and corruption. Attorneys for FIFA Provide 
Update on Internal Investigation and Details on Compensation for Former Top Officials, 
supra note 297. 
114 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:68 
details of the Kattner-Valcke-Blatter bonus arrangement were 
released, KPMG resigned as FIFA's outside auditor. 300 The Wall Street 
Journal reported that it had seen documents and heard from sources 
that KPMG, which had enjoyed sixteen years as FIF A's outside 
auditor, had questioned lnfantino's promise to expand development 
funds to $5 million, since such sums "bear an increased risk of funds 
being misused."301 Further, the Financial Times reported that KPMG 
raised issues with Infantino in May and ultimately concluded that it 
"did not have trust that the new management would do what they said 
they were going to do to improve governance. "302 
Three months later, in September 2016, FIFA reported that 
PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC"), another Big Four public 
accounting firm, had agreed to become FIFA's auditor. 303 Consistent 
with the long-standing practice of FIFA spinmeisters trumpeting its 
good-looking reforms, FIFA announced the hiring of PwC as a 
replacement for KPMG and as a step it was taking to improve its 
transparency. Specifically, FIFA stated: "In light of the serious 
allegations involving financial transactions outlined by the Swiss and 
US authorities, it is essential that the financial function at FIFA be 
externally reviewed and thoroughly reformed."304 Additionally, 
FIFA President Gianni Infantino welcomed the 
decision of the ... FIFA Council as a further important 
step in the reform process underway at FIFA and an 
300. FIFA Statement on KPMG Resignation, FIFA.COM (June 13, 2016), 
http://www. fi fa.com/about-fifa/news/y=20 l 6/m=6/news=fifa-statement-on-kpmg-
resignation-2801452.html 
301. John Letzig & Joshua Robinson, Auditor Raised Issues With FIFA Before Resigning, 
WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2016, 7:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/auditor-raised-issues-
with-fifa-before-resigning-1466380050. 
302. KPMG also expressed concerns over proposals to increase funds to national and 
regional football associations. During his presidential campaign, Mr Infantino pledged to 
invest£ I .2bn - or a quarter ofFifa's revenues - into football development around the world. 
KPMG wrote: 'Significantly higher funds available to all confederations and member 
associations bear an increased risk of funds being misused as some of these entities may not 
yet have the organisational structure, governance and/or possibilities to spend significantly 
more money in an appropriate way to promote and develop football in their country."' Murad 
Ahmed, Harriet Agnew, & Ralph Atkins, KPMG Quits Fifa over Reform Programme Doubts, 
FIN. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/Ode97f98-360f-l le6-9a05-
82a9bl5a8ee7. 
303. Michael Cohn, FIFA Picks PwC as New Audit Firm, ACCT. TODAY (Sept. 19, 2016, 
1 :29 PM), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/audit-accounting/fifa-picks-pwc-as-new-
audit-firm-79290-1.html. 
304. Jessica Fino, FIFA Appoints PwC Switzerland as Auditor, ECONOMIA (Sept. 19, 
2016), http:// economia. icaew .com/news/september-2016/fifa-appoints-pwc-switzerland-as-
auditor. 
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example of how the organisation is restoring its 
financial control and management mechanisms to the 
fullest. "We are delighted to have appointed PwC, and 
we look forward to working with them as FIFA moves 
forward with its programme of reforms. 305 
C. Accountability: Can It Be Imposed? 306 
115 
The Department of Justice Indictment has triggered criminal 
investigations in several countries, including Switzerland,307 
Germany308 and England, 309 as well as in the home countries of some 
of those indicted. While neither Blatter nor the former Secretary 
General ofFIF A, Jerome Valcke, was named in the Indictment, Blatter 
has hired Richard Cullen, Chairman of McGuire Woods, as well as 
Lorenz Emi, a Zurich lawyer310 and Valcke has hired a prominent New 
305. FIFA Appoints PwC as New Auditors, FIFA.COM (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www. fi fa.corn/ about-fifa/news/y=2016/m=9/news=fifa-appoints-pwc-as-new-auditors-
2834104.html. An accounting industry publication adopted FIFA's characterization of the 
replacement ofKPMG by PwC similarly: "According to [FIFA], the new position was part of 
its package of reforms, which aim to commit to the principles of good governance, integrity 
and transparency. Fino, supra note 304. 
306. For a discussion of how FIFA's commercial sponsors may effectuate change see 
Pammela S. Quinn's article, Sponsoring Corruption. "Using case studies of corruption and 
corporate sponsor responses to scandals in the IOC and FIFA,[Quinn] considers broadly how 
and when corporate sponsors can effectively serve as private regulators of corruption in 
international sports." Specifically, Quinn states: "FIFA's sponsors include some of the largest 
multi-national enterprises in the world, including Coca-Cola, Budweiser, Adidas, and 
Hyundai/Kia. While traditionally viewed as subjects of regulation, large multi-national 
corporations also possess enormous potential to wield regulatory authority over FIFA and 
other international sporting bodies and events that they sponsor." Pammela S. Quinn, 
Sponsoring Corruption, 32 Mo. J. INT' LL. _ (2017). 
307. In addition to the criminal investigations of Blatter and Valcke, the Swiss are looking 
into others including a former Secretary General of FIFA at the time of the alleged bribes paid 
in connection with the 2006 World Cup hosted by Germany. Former FIFA Executive Linsi 
Added to Corruption Probe, SWISSINFO (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:35 PM), 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/house-raid_former-fifa-executive-linsi-added-to-corruption-
probe/42718020. In connection with the same alleged bribe the Swiss are also investigating 
German football legend Franz Beckenbauer as well as Wolfgang Niersbach, Theo Zwanziger 
and Horst Rudolf Schmidt. Franz Beckenbauer Investigated for Corruption over 2006 World 
Cup, BBC (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37246543. 
308. Germany has begun an investigation into tax violations in connection with the alleged 
bribes related to the 2006 World Cup. German Football Chief Resigns over Corruption 
Allegations, BBC (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/34770939. 
309. Suzi Ring, FIFA Faces Possible Money Laundering Probe From U.K. Prosecutors, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-
2 7 /fifa-faces-possible-money-laundering-probe-from-u-k-prosecutors. 
310. David Ingram & Nate Raymond, Exclusive: FIFA 's Blatter, Va/eke Hire U.S. 
Lawyers for Corruption Probe, REUTERS (June 17, 2015, 7:35 PM), 
http ://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fi fa-blatter-idUSKBNOOX2Q W2015061 7. 
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York White Collar Crime lawyer, Barry Berke.311 
The Indictment has also attracted the attention of others in 
football, including South Africa's Danny Jordaan312 and Brazil's Ricardo 
Teixeira,313 who are said to have restricted their international travel to 
avoid arrest. While the Indictment has served as an effective disrupter for 
some within FIFA and football, the Department of Justice proceedings 
cannot directly impose accountability upon FIFA. As demonstrated 
herein, the necessary fundamental reforms FIFA and football require will 
not be imposed from within. 
Is there a realistic means, a practical route for successfully making 
football, starting with FIFA, responsible to its fans and other 
constituencies? Is there any hope at all that FIFA can be made 
accountable? 
1. Those Who Have Resigned Give Us Some Hope 
As we have seen there have been truly independent persons and 
entities associated with FIFA. Five of them have recently found it 
necessary to make principled withdrawals from FIFA. For example, 
Transparency International refused to join the IGC once it understood 
that Mark Pieth, its Chair, was to be paid $128,000 plus the daily $5000 
fee paid to other IGC members. 314 
Alexandra Wrage of Trace International resigned from the IGC, 
after participating on an unpaid basis, when she concluded that no 
genuine FIFA reform was possible through the IGC process;315 Michael 
Garcia resigned as head of the Investigative Chamber of the Ethics 
Committee after the Adjudicative Chamber distorted and 
misinterpreted the conclusions of his report on the bidding to host the 
2018 and 2022 World Cup Championships;316 FIFA's truly 
independent Chief Financial Officer, Domenico Scala, resigned after 
Infantino arranged to give the FIFA Executive Council the power to 
fire the independent officers supposedly overseeing their activities. 317 
Finally, after sixteen years FIFA 's independent public accounting firm, 
3 I 1. Id. 
312. Jordaan Knew About $10m, but Denies Bribery, ENCA (June I, 2015, 5:51 AM), 
https://www .enca.com/south-africa/j ordaan-knew-about-1 Om-denies-bribery. 
3 I 3. Ziegler, supra note 68. 
314. Fans say no to FIFA reform committee, FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS FED'N (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.fsf.org.uk/latest-news/view/fans-say-no-to-fifa-reform-committee. 
315. Alexandra Wrage did participate in the IGC as a truly independent member, but 
refused all compensation. Wrage, supra note 180. 
316. See supra Section IV.C. 
317. Gibson, supra note 282. 
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KPMG, withdrew from auditing FIFA after it concluded it could not 
trust FIFA management to implement reforms at FIFA.318 
It should not be surprising that not one of these resignations, any 
one of which should have been deeply embarrassing to the leadership 
of FIFA, has had any discernible impact on operations at FIFA. Some 
evidence of one subtle change at FIFA may be inferred from the 
November 2016 announcement by Infantino that he had suspended 
development payments to twenty-three national football associations 
that did not have audited financials and other appropriate controls.319 
This confirms the concern KPMG is reported to have expressed to 
lnfantino320 that the larger development payments promised by 
Infantino as part of his election campaign for FIFA President, could 
not be tracked and that there would be no way to audit the actual use 
of these funds. 321 
2. The Best Hope is Action by Switzerland 
a. Earlier Swiss "Actions" 
The most direct and effective means of imposing accountability 
on FIFA and thus on football generally is action by the Swiss 
government. FIFA is organized under the Swiss Civil Code as a not-
for-profit organization322 and there are currently few Swiss laws that 
can be applied to such an organization. More to the point, there has 
been little interest in Switzerland in effectively pursuing FIFA. Some 
earlier Swiss investigations into major bribes at FIFA have resulted in 
a formal termination of investigation and a decision not to prosecute 
because, until April 2016, Swiss law did not prohibit FIFA bribes. 323 
A criminal investigation of Blatter commenced only on 
September 24, 2015, three months after the May 2015 Department of 
Justice Indictment. 324 The Swiss Office of the Attorney General 
318. FIFA Statement on KPMG Resignation, supra note 300. 
319. Id. 
320. Letzig & Robinson, supra note 301. 
321. Brian Homewood, FIFA President Threatens Funding to Nontransparent Members, 
GLOBE & MAIL (2016), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/soccer/fifa-president-
threatens-funding-to-members-who-miss-transparency-standards/article32674183/. 
322. FIFA, supra note 8, art I.I. 
323. Michael Shields, Swiss Crack Down on Bribery as 'Lex FIFA' Set to Take Force, 
REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2016. 8:53 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-corruption-
idUSKCNOXHl GE. 
324. Criminal proceedings against the President of FIFA, FED. COUNCIL (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https ://www.admin.ch/ gov/en/start/dokumentation/medienmitteil ungen .msg-id-5 8891.html. 
.. 
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announced325 that it was investigating Blatter for "criminal 
mismanagement"326 and "misappropriation."327 These possible charges 
relate to a contract executed by Blatter ten years earlier, in 2005, with 
Jack Warner328 of the Caribbean Football Union. It has been reported 
that the contract transferred certain rights to the 2010 World Cup and 
2014 World Cup for a total of $600,000.329 Warner allegedly resold 
these rights for $20,000,000.330 The Swiss Attorney General suspects 
that this contract may have been "unfavorable" to FIFA. 331 
In addition to this ten-year old matter, the Swiss have announced 
that they are investigating Blatter for making a possibly "disloyal" 
payment related to the $2,000,000 payment Blatter acknowledges that 
he made to Platini in February, 2011. 332 Blatter and Platini have 
defended this transaction, for which there is a complete lack of 
documentation, as having been made for work done by Platini when 
he worked at FIFA between 1999 and 2002.333 That would make the 
fact that Platini withdrew from contesting the FIFA Presidency in 2011 
an umelated coincidence. This investigation also began only after the 
Department of Justice Indictment and, is not a prosecution. Having 
been embarrassed into announcing the investigation, it remains to be 
seen whether the Swiss will bother to prosecute during Blatter's 
lifetime. 
Additional evidence of Switzerland's lack of enthusiasm for 
325. Id. 
326. SCHWEIZERlSCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE] Oct. 1, 2016, art. 
158 (Switz.). 
327. Id. STGB art. 138. 
328. Warner is one of the CONCACAF officials indicted by the Department of Justice in 
its Indictment. Warner was CONCACAF President for twenty-one years (1990-2011) and a 
member of the FIFA Executive Committee for twenty-eight years (1983-2011). He has been 
accused of corrupt activities more than once. He resigned from al I football related positions in 
2011. In 2013 CONCACAF found him guilty of fraud against COBNCACAF and FIFA. 
FIFA itself took no action following Warner's resignation until September 2015. 
329. Sam Borden, Sepp Blatter, FIFA President, Faces Criminal Investigation in 
Switzerland, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https ://www .nytimes.com/2015/09/26/sports/soccer/sepp-blatter-fi fa-switzerland-criminal-
proceedings.html? _r=O. 
330. The Rise and Fall of Sepp Blatter, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/27 /sports/soccer/sepp-b latter-fifa-
timeline.html. 
331. Borden, supra note 329. 
332. Sep Blatter, Michael Platini banned by FJF A court for eight years: 'I will fight until 
the end', NAT'L POST (Dec. 21, 2015, 12: 15 PM), http://nationalpost.com/sports/soccer/sepp-
b latter-michel-p latin i-banned-by-fifa-court-for-eight-years-i-wi 11-fight-until-the-
end/wcm/88bc86fe-cbe3-46b6-9ff4-103cb0f9e2eb. 
333. Id. 
2017] THE PERFECT CRIME? 119 
imposing accountability on FIFA relates to the FIFA decision in 2000 
to have Germany host the 2006 World Cup. Following the 2015 
Department of Justice Indictment, the Swiss were inspired to 
"commence" investigating a payment made by German football legend 
Franz Beckenbauer. 334 In a statement made by Beckenbauer in 2015 
he confirmed that the payment in question was made in 2000, but that 
it was not for votes. 335 German authorities have also recently 
commenced investigations into this payment. 336 
The reluctance of the Swiss to interfere with the operations of the 
world's most popular sport can be seen in the Swiss dismissal of 
criminal proceedings against former FIFA President Havelange and his 
former son-in-law, Ricardo Teixeira. The Swiss concluded that 
massive bribes Havelange and Teixeira had received in a scandal 
involving International Sports and Leisure, a Swiss marketing firm, 
were not punishable under Swiss criminal law.337 As we saw, both 
Havelange and Teixeira resigned from FIFA to avoid FIFA's 
"sanctions. "338 
b. Switzerland: Nirvana for Sports Criminals 
FIFA and other sports governing bodies are situated in 
Switzerland for many reasons. Neutrality, a convenient central 
European location, and an educated work force are certainly part of the 
explanation. The unique features of Swiss law, however, likely mean 
a great deal more. The "organized irresponsibility"339 of Swiss not-for-
profit entities, has permitted FIFA to grow into today's self-dealing 
"cesspit of corruption"340 where football's officials are free to act, not 
"For the Game" or "For the World," but "Just for Us." According to 
334. Beckenbauer was chair of the German World Cup organizing Committee. He was 
captain of the German team which won the world cup in 1974 and coached the German team 
that won the world cup in 1990. Franz Beckenbauer Investigated for Corruption over 2006 
World Cup, BBC (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
37246543?ocid=global_bbccom_email_O10920l6_top+sport+stories. 
335. Id. The German football league acting belatedly in this matter suspended the 
president of Germany's football association at the time of tis payment for one year. 
336. President of German Football Association Wolfgang Niersbach Resigns, DW (Sept. 
I I, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/president-of-german-football-association-wolfgang-
niersbach-resigns/a- I 883 7386. 
337. ECKERT, supra note 82; Shields, supra note 323. See David Bond, The £66m 'Bribe' 
Shadow Hanging over Fifa, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 13, 2008, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/columnists/davidbond/2294323/The-66m-bribe-shadow-
hanging-over-Fifa.html. 
338. See supra Section V.A.3 
339. Duval, supra note 77. 
340. The Economist Explains How America ls Pursuing FIFA, ECONOMIST (Jun. I, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains. 
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Tl's "Global Corruption Report: Sport,"341 Swiss criminal bribery law 
cannot be applied to FIFA officials because they are not "public 
officials. "342 
c. Swiss hnplicit Complicity 
To understand how difficult it may be to motivate the Swiss 
government to impose true accountability upon FIFA under Swiss law, 
we must note that Switzerland serves as the preeminent domicile of 
international sports associations. Currently there are at least sixty-five 
international sports governing organizations headquartered in 
Switzerland, although few have the billions FIFA finds so tempting 
because no one is looking. 343 These associations range from those that 
oversee archery, boxing and canoeing to those involved with table 
tennis, taekwondo and volleyball. 344 In the aggregate this sports 
organization industry contributes over $1 billion annually to the Swiss 
economy345 and generates more than 30,000 overnight hotel stays.346 It 
is no surprise; therefore, that Switzerland remains solicitous to this 
comer of its economy. 
There is another basis for Switzerland's reluctance to prosecute 
FIFA officials. Dubai is a competitor for hosting international sports 
organizations. Dubai is globally more centrally located than 
Switzerland and has the world's busiest international airport347 making 
international connections convenient. Perhaps even more threatening 
to Switzerland, Dubai imposes no personal income tax on non-
residents living there. 348 The challenge presented by Dubai is evident 
in the move of the International Cricket Council to Dubai. 349 The 
economic significance to Switzerland of FIFA and other international 
341. GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: SPORT (Gareth Sweeney ed., 2016). 
342. This is precisely the reason the Department of Justice Indictment, which tracked more 
than $100 million in bribes, included no charges under the U.S. FCPA. Lucien W. Valloni & 
Eric P. Neuenschwander, The Role of Switzerland as Host, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: 
SPORT 322 (Gareth Sweeney ed., 2016). 
343. Simon Bradley, Swiss Set to Get Tough over Sports Corruption, SW!SSINFO (Oct. 2, 
2014, 11 :00 AM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/new-rules_swiss-set-to-get-tough-over-
sports-corruption/40801520. 
344. AMANDINE BOUSIGUE & CLAUDE STRICKER, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS TN SWITZERLAND (2015). 
345. Id. at 31. 
346. Id. at 39. 
347. Katia Hetter & Karla Cripps, The World's Busiest Airport Is .... ,CNN (Sept. 9, 2016, 
7 :08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/09/aviation/worlds-busiest-airports-final-2015/. 
348. Dubai Taxation, LIVING IN DUBAI, http://www.livingindubai.org/dubai-taxation/ (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017). 
349. Cricket Chiefs Move Base to Dubai, BBC (Mar. 7, 2005, 4:42 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/cricket/432660 I .stm. 
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sports governing associations has led some to refer to the "implicit 
complicity350 of Swiss government"351 in the problems of FIFA and 
other sports associations hosted there. For example, one commentator 
stated: 
Financial transparency at the [Sports Governing Bodies 
("SGB")] is relatively low and generally of bad quality 
in terms of readability. Due to their status as Swiss 
associations, many international SGBs are exempted of 
disclosing their accounts and properly reporting on the 
financial flows that enter and leave their institutions. 
This lack of financial transparency is probably the main 
reason why they are often at the centre of corruption 
networks. The implicit complicity of the Swiss State ... 
and Swiss local authorities, is undeniable. It is not 
unlike the organized financial opacity that enabled 
Switzerland to become the central node of tax evading 
schemes. For long, the Swiss state turned a blind eye on 
the financial flows involving SGBs. It was an unspoken 
quid pro quo for their collective decision to locate their 
seats, with the adjacent revenues and employment 
opportunities, in Switzerland. 352 
In speaking of the actions needed to start FIFA on the lengthy 
road to meaningful compliance with modem corporate governance, 
Harvard's John Ruggie concluded in his report to FIFA on Human 
Rights: 
At the risk of stating the obvious, governments have the 
primary obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill human 
rights. This includes the governments hosting 
international sports events as well as national sports 
bodies. It also includes the governments of countries in 
which global sports organizations such as FIFA are 
registered. But the responsibility of those organizations 
to address human rights risks with which they are 
involved exists independently of any government's 
abilities or willingness to act on its obligations. 353 
Further, Alexandra Wrage, the authentically independent member 
350. Wrage, supra note 180. 
351. Duval, supra note 77. 
352. Id. 
353. RuGGIE, supra note 254, at 36. 
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of the IGC who refused Blatter's $5000 per day fee and later resigned 
in frustration, has concluded, "[t]he only entity capable of insisting on 
transparency at FIFA is the Swiss government. .. "354 
C. In a Perfect World 
1. Other Groups 
An organization created to reform football, New FIFA Now, 355 
has proposed that an independent group overseen by United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) be 
established to "make practical proposals for FIFA reform."356 
FIFA is one of the most discredited organisations in the world with 
serial allegations of corruption plaguing almost its every move off-
the-field, symptomatic of a crisis of leadership, governance and 
accountability. 357 
UNESCO has a history of involvement in sports and is considered 
the "UN custodian of sport policy development."358 Additionally, the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime ("UNODC") has published "a 
"Strategy for Safeguarding against Corruption in Major Public 
Events."359 This study notes that the World Cup is precisely the type of 
major public event that has attracted corrupt activity.360 
FIFA hardly needs more "proposals." FIFA must be held 
accountable and required to implement the many proposals that have 
already been made. As a very political organization and one that does 
not create binding legislation, the United Nations offers no hope of 
imposing accountability on FIFA. 
2. FCPA and FIFA 
One small step toward pressuring FIFA to reform would be a 
354. Wrage, supra note 180. 
355. Charter for FIFA Reform, NEwFIFANOW.ORG (June 2016), 
https://www.newfifanow.org/charter-for-fifa-reform.html. 
356. Owen Gibson, New Fifa Now Talks a Good Game but Sepp Blatter Will Not Be 
Quaking, GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:34 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/b log/2015/jan/21 /new-fifa-now-sepp-b latter-brussels. 
357. Charter for FIFA Reform, supra note 355. 
358. NADA AL-NASHIF, UNESCO, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: SPORT 318 (Gareth 
Sweeney ed., 2016). 
359. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, A STRATEGY FOR SAFEGUARDING 
AGAINST CORRUPTION IN MAJOR PUBLIC EVENTS (2013). 
360. UNODC is currently led by Yury Fedotov, a career diplomat from Russia and earlier, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There should be little doubt that even as an Under 
Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Fedotov's first loyalty is to the Russian 
Government. 
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change to how the FCP A is enforced. This act now criminalizes 
bribes paid to "foreign officials," including officials of "public 
international organizations." 361 The President of the United States is 
authorized to add entities to the list of such international 
organizations.362 This list already includes the United Nations 
and the World Trade Organization, as well as the 
International Fertilizer Development Center and the Pacific Salmon 
Commission.363 FIFA is certainly an international, quasi-public 
institution. 
It is important to emphasize that current U.S. law authorizes 
the President to make this change, without involving a gridlocked, 
do-nothing or constipated-by-lobbyists Congress. 364 Doing so 
would subject FIFA offcials to the provisions of the FCPA and 
anyone with a connection to the United States paying a bribe to a 
FIFA official would be paying to a "foreign official" and thus 
subject to the criminal provisions of the FCP A. While this would 
have no effect on the self-dealing within FIFA such as the Kattner, 
Valcke, Blatter $80,000,000 bonus deal described above,365 such a 
designation would impact bribery by sports marketing companies, 
bulk ticket purchasers and vote buying within FIFA so long as there 
was some connection with the United States.366 
As support for this Presidential action, FIFA already sees itself as 
a supranational organization. Any argument that a mere sports 
organization should not have its officials seen as the equivalent of 
leaders of sovereign nations has been answered by Blatter himself. In 
an interview during which he challenged the power of the FIFA Ethics 
Committee to suspend him from football, Blatter announced that only 
the FIFA Congress, and not the Ethics Committee, could remove him 
from office. The report of the interview continued: "Comparing himself 
to a state president, Blatter told Swiss broadcaster SRF: 'If one wants 
361. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(l)(B)(ii), 78dd-2(h)(2)(B)(ii), 78dd-
3(f)(2)[B](ii). 
362. Bruce W. Bean, An Interim Essay on FIFA 's World Cup of Corruption: The 
Desperate Need for International Corporate Governance Standards at FIFA, 22 ILSAJ. INT'L 
&COMP. L. 367, 391 (2016). 
363. 22 C.F.R. § 288 (2016). 
364. Similar changes in the separate national laws enacted pursuant to the obligations 
undertaken by thirty-six nations to enforce the OECD Convention might further extend 
accountability to FIFA. 
365. See supra Section IV.B.6. 
366. Such connections may be quite attenuated as FCP A charges have succeeded where the 
U.S. connection has been as fleeting as a wire transfer passing through a New York bank. 
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to revoke an elected president, only parliament can ask for that. "'367 If 
Blatter saw himself as a Head of State, that is precisely the category of 
bribe taker the PCP A was designed to address. 
V. Forget it 
A. Does FIFA Need Change? 
It is obvious that a culture or equilibrium of corruption pervades 
the entire FIFA ecosystem. There are no current mechanisms working 
to fundamentally change this culture. Will the Infantino regime bring 
change? At his first FIFA Congress as President in May 2016 Infantino 
suggested no further change at FIFA was needed. "Fifa is back on 
track .... So I can officially inform you here, the crisis is over."368 This, 
of course, is directly from the FIFA "Corruption Crisis Playbook," as 
Blatter had made a similar statement when he declared his Roadmap 
to Reform a success in 2013 :369 "We have been through a difficult 
time. It has been a test for football and those who lead it. As your 
captain, I can say we have weathered the storm."370 
Jordan's Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein, the man who became 
Infantino's "kingmaker" by withdrawing from the FIFA presidential 
election at the FIFA Extraordinary Congress in February 2016 and 
giving his support to Infantino,371 does not agree that the crisis is over. 
Prince Ali has attacked Infantino's "complete betrayal" of FIFA 
immediately after the May 2016 FIFA Congress. 372 
Even Mark Pieth, who in 2011 said " ... I'm convinced that 
[FIFA] will get it right this time around,"373 and was later called 
"Blatter's poodle,"374 has come around. Pieth has called for imposing 
independent accountability at FIFA. For example, four weeks after the 
May 2016 Congress where Infantino created the right in the Executive 
Council to remove "independent" FIFA executives, Pieth announced: 
"We have to stop the self-regulation of Fifa .... For me [Infantino's 
367. Silke Koltrowitz, Humiliated Blatter Says Only FIFA Congress Can Bar Him, 
REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2015, 9:55 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-fifa-blatter-
idUKKBNOTE2TF20151125. 
368. Gibson, supra note 356. 
369. See supra Section IV.B.4. 
370. Robinson, supra note 199. 
371. See supra Section V.B. 
372. Rumsby, supra note 274. 
373. Pieth: I'm Convinced FIFA Will Get It Right, FIFA.com (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://www.fifa.com/govemance/news/y=201 l/m=l l/news=pieth-convinced-fifa-will-get-
right-1550071.html. 
374. Bradley, supra note 203. 
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move to get the right to remove independent FIFA executives l means 
a return to the Blatter Middle Ages."375 FIF A's "non-sponsor,"376 
Jamie Fuller, has said, " ... Fifa must be dragged kicking and screaming 
into change."377 Additionally, the Carrard Report observed that "FIFA 
has a long road ahead,"378 and the Harvard study, "Off Pitch: Football's 
financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen them," described 
instituting reforms in football as follows: "Nothing here will be easy 
to do."379 
Given that there is no obvious way to get the Swiss to regulate 
FIFA and that in any case this would be a terrifically difficult thing to 
achieve, should we bother? There are many higher priorities, including 
genocide, regional wars, terrorism, poverty, income inequality, etc. In 
any case, our track record in eliminating corruption is dismal. 
The FCP A was a wonderful effort to rid the world of extortion 
and bribery in international business. A nice try. But after almost four 
decades, the campaign to defeat corruption, to Puritanize the rest of the 
world, has worked no better abroad than it has at home. We still have 
reports of bribery and corruption in business almost every day. TI has 
had nearly a quarter of a century to make the world free of corruption; 
but the TI Corruption Perceptions Index tells us: "Sixty-eight per cent 
of countries worldwide have a serious corruption problem. Half of the 
G20 are among them. Not one single country, anywhere in the world, 
is corruption-free. 380 
And this after nearly forty years of the FCPA and nearly a quarter 
century of the efforts of TI. 
375. Infantino 's FIFA is a 'return to the Blatter Middle Ages, 'SWISSINFO (June 18, 2016, 
12 :21 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/mark-pieth_infantino-s-fifa-is-a-return-to-the-
blatter-middle-ages-/42236068 
376. A Swiss sport clothing company, Skins, led by Jamie Fuller, has declared itself to be 
the first "non-sponsor" of FIFA and has called upon other sponsors to withhold support. 
SKINS: Official Non-Sponsor, BBD PERFECT STORM, 
http://www.bbdperfectstorm.com/portfolio/skins-official-non-sponsor (last visited Jan. 4, 
2017); SKINS Announce Inaugural Non-sponsorship of FIFA, NEwFIFANow.ORG (Jan. 23, 
2015), https://www.newfifanow.org/january-23-2015.html; Charles Sale, Sports Ethics 
Campaigner Jamie Fuller Turns Heat on FIFA Sponsors to Spark Reform, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 
15, 2015, 10: 18 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-29 l 2549/Sports-
ethics-campaigner-Jami e-Ful ler-turns-heat-FIF A-sponsors-spark-reform.html. 
377. Owen Gibson, New Fifa Now talks a good game but Sepp Blatter will not be quaking, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2015/jan/21/new-fifa-
now-sepp-blatter-brussels. 
378. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMM., supra note 227, at 4. 
379. Andrews & Harrington, supra note 17, at 100. 
380. Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, supra note 99. 
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B. An Impermissible Thought 
While corruption may be difficult to measure precisely, if we look 
at FIFA, it is beyond dispute that corruption is rife within football. 
FIFA and football have been corrupt for decades. During the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, as FIFA' s revenues multiplied, large 
bribes were added to football's encyclopedia of committed corrupt 
crimes. Given FIFA's resistance to any meaningful change in its 
corrupt ways and Switzerland's implicit quid pro quo of no 
enforcement in exchange for having sports governing associations 
domiciled there, should we abandon this battle? The fans love the 
game. And war, genocide, and poverty are just a few of the many 
higher priorities for national and international attention. 
The culture of corruption within football may be compared to the 
current American system of governmental lobbying. Campaign 
contributors, Political Action Committees, "bundlers" of smaller 
campaign contributions into attention-getting size, and five K Street 
lobbyists for each Member of Congress are each an integral, accepted 
part of America's culture. We call it "lobbying," but is this just our 
way oflegalizing bribery? As Professor Michael Johnston has written: 
[A ]re affluent market democracies really . . . "less 
corrupt" [than less developed nations] ... or have they 
just evolved legal systems that are accommodating to 
wealth interests? Major corporations in the United 
States do not bribe cabinet members in the way their 
counterparts bribe finance ministers in developing 
countries, but they may have little need to do so in a 
political system where wealth and corporate backing 
are major political currencies. America may rank high 
on indices of "governance," but do citizens trust their 
state to aggregate broad-based interests into beneficial 
policy? ... Neoliberal reforms do not so much end 
corruption as privatize it. 381 
Johnston is not alone in condemning the lobbying practices 
American society currently accepts. For example, Michael Mariello 
notes: 
Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, now a professor at the 
University of California at Berkeley, doesn't make a distinction 
381. Michael Johnston, Controlling Global Corruption: Are We There Yet?, 104 
CURRENT HIST. 425, 429 (2005). 
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between [bribery and lobbying]. When asked .... , "What's the real 
difference between me bribing a customs agent so that I can bring a 
banned substance into the country or me contributing money to a 
senator and then cajoling him into making the substance legal for 
import?" Reich answered, "Frankly, I don't see much difference. A 
bribe is a bribe. People authorized only to act in the public interest may 
not use their office for private gain. Period."382 
Today Americans accept our political campaign funding system 
and our lobbying practices just as our society formerly accepted 
slavery, smoking, and having women "stay in the kitchen." These 
were cultural norms at the time and not actually the result of evil, non-
homicidal dictators or European octogenarian sports figures. If we 
accept lobbyists as purveyors of legalized corruption, should we also 
accept FIFA' s corruption? 
Clearly this is the wrong answer, but given the many more 
important matters facing our globalized world and the difficulty of 
imposing accountability on FIFA without action by Switzerland, 
FIFA's Habitat for Crime, perhaps we must simply wait for 
Switzerland to act. 
So long as "no one is watching," as John Wooden has said, we 
can anticipate additional chapters in the FIFA Farce. Nevertheless, it 
is certain that hundreds of millions of people will continue to play what 
legendary Brazilian footballer, Pele, called the "beautiful game,'' 
regardless of how ugly FIFA turns out to be. 
382. Michael Maiello, Corruption, American Style, FORBES (Jan 22, 2009, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/0 I /22/corruption-lobbying-bribes-biz-corruption09-
cx_mm_ O 122maiello.html. 
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APPENDIX 
Defendants and their status as of January 14, 2017 
Data from the Indictment and various news sources. 
Defendant 2016 Current Status 
Age 
1. Luis Bedoya, member of 57 PLEA383 
FIFA Executive Committee 
& CONMEBOL Vice 
President 
2. Charles Blazer, former 71 PLEA 2013 384 
CONCAF general secretary 
3. Alejandro Burzaco, former 51 PLEA385 
General Manager and 
Chairman of Tomeos y 
Competencias S.A. 
4. Zorana Danis, Co-founder 53 PLEA386 
and Owner of International 
Soccer Marketing Inc. 
5. Jose Hawilla, owner of 72 PLEA387 
Traffic Group 
6. Robert Huguet, CEO of 53 PLEA388 
383. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, FIFA PROSECUTION UNITED STATES V. ALFREDO HA WIT, ET ALAND 
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